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ANCILLARY JURISDICTION: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
A REVISED HISTORY
MARY Bucnm MCMANAMON*
In the last twenty-five years, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction have been the subject of much discussion by scholars' and
judges.2 The labels "ancillary" and "pendent" are applied to the juris-
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undertaking.
1. See, e.g., Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 759 (1972); Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. Cm. L. Rv.
753 (1978); Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
129 (1987); Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987
DuKE L.J. 34; Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and
the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALin. L. REv. 1399
(1983) [hereinafter Matasar, "One Constitutional Case"]; Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 103 (1983) [hereinafter Matasar, Primer]; Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,
26 S. TEx. L.J. 1 (1985); Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States
Federal District Courts, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 279 (1976); Schenkier, Ensuring Access to
Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. Rav. 245 (1980);
Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262
(1968); Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: The Eleventh Amendment, Erie and Pendent State
Law Claims, 34 BunAio L. Rav. 227 (1985); Sullivan, Pendent Jurisdiction: The Impact
of Hagans and Moor, 7 IND. L. REv. 925 (1974); Note, Unravelling the "Pendent Party"
Controversy: A Revisionist Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 64 B.U.L. REv.
895 (1985) [hereinafter B.U. Note]; Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,
77 CoLum. L. Rav. 127 (1977) [hereinafter CoLum. Comment]; Note, A Closer Look at
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 1935 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 HARV. Note]; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. Rv. 657 (1968); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:
Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1263 (1975) [hereinafter UCLA
Comment]; Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265 (1971)
[hereinafter VA. Note]; Note, The Concept of Law-tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and
Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978) [hereinafter YALE Note].
2. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Acton Co. of Mass. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d
76 (1st Cir. 1982); Boudreaux v. Puckett, 611 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1980); Lentino v. Fringe
Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st
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diction exercised by a federal court over nonfederal claims that arise in
a case properly before it. 4 Twentieth-century lawyers are disturbed by what
they view as a "manifest paradox" :5 the tension between the limited nature
of federal jurisdiction 6 and its expansion through the use of these doctrines.
Seeking a constitutional basis for them, modern lawyers have turned to
two nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases 7 for authority. Based on these
two cases, an entire history of the doctrines has evolved. The Supreme
Court has accepted this history, choosing to base the modern doctrines of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction on their "lineal ancestor[s]."'
A close study of the cases cited as the first ones to apply these
doctrines, however, is startling. These cases actually belie the accepted
history. This fact might not cause undue alarm, except to a historian.
Unfortunately, because the ancestry of the doctrines has been miscon-
strued, the modern rules defining them are unnecessarily complicated.
First, early American jurists would have seen no distinction between
Cir. 1979); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S.
814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 486 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1973); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890
(4th Cir. 1972); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
944 (1972); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971);
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970);
Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); LASA per L'Industria
Del Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); Rumbaugh v.
Winifrede R.R. Co., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964); Bolton
v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613
(D. Kan. 1978); Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Home Ins.
Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
3. In this article, the term "federal issues" or "federal claims" refers to those issues
or claims that are normally within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, as given
to those courts by the Constitution and federal jurisdictional statutes. Thus the term includes
not only federal question cases, but also diversity suits. The term "nonfederal" refers to
issues and claims that are jurisdictionally insufficient to be heard alone in federal court.
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.11 (1978).
4. For more specific definitions of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, see infra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
5. Freer, supra note I, at 55; accord, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
721 (1966); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 nn.41-42, 1146 n.46, 1157 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDtRE § 3523, at 95, 117 (2d ed. 1984); Baker, supra note 1, at 761;
Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 110-11; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 245-47; Shakman,
supra note 1, at 262; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 895-97; 1982 HAgv. Note, supra note 1,
at 1935; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 268; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 641-48; see Matasar,
"One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1402 n.4.
6. It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction .... They are empowered to hear only such cases as are within
the judicial power of the United States, as defined in the Constitution, and have
been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress.
C. WEIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 22 (4th ed. 1983).
7. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
8. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
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"pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction as they are defined today. This
unnecessary pigeon-holing has led to an almost unintelligible dichotomy
in the modern cases.9 Moreover, the three most recent Supreme Court
pronouncements on the doctrines'0 are rigid and unduly limited." These
limitations are based, at least in part, on a misunderstanding of the origins
of the doctrines. Yet if one sees the doctrines in historical perspective,
one recognizes that these restrictions are unnecessary.
It is, therefore, time to set the record straight. This article will first
review the conventional history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,
revealing its flaws. 12 Next, this article will demonstrate that it is an ancient
doctrine that the court that first has jurisdiction of a matter may decide
every question in the case, even if some questions are normally outside
that court's jurisdiction ("the doctrine" 3). Although the origins of this
9. The exacerbation of the dichotomy in recent years can be traced to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See infra notes 492-503 and
accompanying text. All of us who have taught this subject in law school can empathize with
Professor Matasar who noted:
The decisions seem especially enigmatic to students. It never ceases to amaze
me that at the end of the semester each year the question I most often hear from
my students is: "Say, just what is the difference between pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction anyhow?" So much for the clarity of my teaching; or, is it so much
for the clarity of the decisions?
Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 105 n.6. This article will argue that it is the decisions
that are unclear. For example, in Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth
Circuit was not sure whether the nonfederal claim before it involved a pendent party, see
infra note 22, or an ancillary claim. So the court addressed both situations. See 554 F.2d
at 957. The reader is left confused.
10. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
11. See Freer, supra note 1, at 74-77.
12. See infra notes 19-81 and 338-429 and accompanying text.
13. The doctrine is occasionally referred to as the doctrine of supplemental or incidental
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note I ("supplemental
jurisdiction"); 1982 HARV. Note, supra note I ("incidental jurisdiction"). The term "inci-
dental" is derived from early American descriptions of the doctrine. For example, Chief
Justice Marshall noted that when a federal court has jurisdiction, "then all the other
questions must be decided as incidental to this [question], which gives that jurisdiction."
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824) (emphasis added);
see also McDonough v. Dannery (The Mary Ford), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 197 (1796) (argument
for defendant in error); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 6 (1794) (argument
for appellants). The problem with the word "incidental" is that it carries the connotation
of dependence or lesser worth. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (5th ed. 1979). Yet the
jurisdiction of a court over these so-called "incidental" questions was every bit as valid as
over the principal question. See infra notes 313-37 and accompanying text.
The term "supplemental" is also derived from early American cases applying the
doctrine. For example, in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 461 (1860), the Court
described the nonfederal bill as "supplementary merely to the original suit." (emphasis
added). The term "supplemental" is also problematic because it has the connotation of
something added, generally at a later time. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1290.
While it implies that the supplemental item is a natural part of the whole, its traditional
1989]
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doctrine are unknown, it was well-established in medieval England.' 4 The
colonists brought the doctrine with them to America.' 5 The doctrine was
so basic to the notion of a court's power that it survived the American
Revolution.' 6 The framers of the Constitution and early justices of the
Supreme Court recognized and accepted the doctrine without question. 17
They applied it, not surprisingly, to the same types of cases in which it
had been used in England. But early American jurists also used the doctrine
to solve the new, unique problem of nonfederal claims arising in federal
cases. Finally, the article will discuss the importance of the historical
doctrine to today's federal courts. It will conclude with a suggestion for
the appropriate inquiry to determine whether a modern federal court
should exercise jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim in an otherwise federal
case.' 8
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM (AND ITS FLAWS) CONCERNING THE
DOCTRINE
A. The Conventional Wisdom
Conventional wisdom holds that the doctrine is distinctly American in
character, devised because of the peculiar nature of the American federal
system of courts. 9 According to the received wisdom, federal judges
developed the doctrine to deal with the intrusion of nonfederal claims in
federal cases. 20 This same wisdom splits the doctrine into two branches:
use in the area of procedure to describe corrective measures makes it somewhat inappropriate.
The author has rejected the use of "catchy" labels to divide and categorize a court's
jurisdiction into components. From the early years of the Republic, there was only one
basic jurisdictional doctrine: a court with jurisdiction over a case may decide every question
in the case. The purpose of this doctrine was to afford the parties complete relief. By using
labels and categories, we have lost sight of the forest for the trees.
14. See infra notes 83-178 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 213-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 430-516 and accompanying text.
19. "No other English-speaking union ... ha[d] a scheme of federal courts." F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-5 (1928 & photo. reprint
1972) (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976); Lentino v. Fringe Em-
ployment Plans, 611 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1979); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075,
1089 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Maltais v. United States, 439 F.
Supp. 540, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger, 74 F.R.D. 93, 97 (N.D. Ga.
1977); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.12, at 65-66 (1985);
C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 28, 30; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3523, at 85, 100, § 3567, at 106, 109; Baker, supra note 1, at 762; Freer, supra
note 1, at 49; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1401 & n. 1; Matasar,
Primer, supra note 1, at 104 nn.1, 3; Miller, supra note 1, at 1; Schenkier, supra note 1,
at 245-46; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 898; 1982 HARV. Note, supra note 1, at 1935; VA.
Note, supra note 1, at 267.
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pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.2' The modern term "pendent jurisdic-
tion" describes a federal court's power to hear a plaintiff's nonfederal
claim that has been appended to a related federal claim.22 The term
"ancillary jurisdiction," as used today, describes a federal court's power
to hear related nonfederal claims raised in any other context than the
pendent situation, such as a defendant's counterclaim or cross-claim. 23 The
commentators recognize these doctrines as similar, but historically dis-
crete.
24
21. A good measure of conventional wisdom is what is currently taught in the law
schools. Virtually every casebook that treats the subject of "pendent" and "ancillary"
jurisdiction presents the students with the prevailing scholarly view. See, e.g., P. BATOR, D.
MELTZER, P. MIsHIUN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1040-52, 1679-88 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; R.
CAsAD, H. FINK & P. SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 270-84 (2d ed. 1989);
J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATE-
RuAs 274-96 (5th ed. 1989); D. CRrmp, W. DORSANEO, 0. CHASE & R. PERSCHBACHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 201-12 (1987); R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K.
CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CrIv PROCEDURE 722-39 (5th ed. 1984); H.
FINK & M. TusHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 429-34, 551-77 (2d ed.
1987); J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 210-19 (2d ed. 1988); M.
REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 604-44 (2d ed. 1989); M.
ROSENBERO, H. SMIT & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS
235-45 (4th ed. 1985).
The author does not wish to imply that because these casebook authors have divided
the material into pendent and' ancillary jurisdiction, they have necessarily accepted the
"conventional wisdom" without question. Rather, several have wondered (not unlike Pro-
fessor Matasar's students, see supra note 9), "What is, after all, the difference between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction?" R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra, at 739.
22. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.12, at 66; Freer,
supra note 1, at 34 n.1; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1401 n.1;
Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 104 n.l; Miller, supra note 1, at 2; B.U. Note, supra
note 1, at 898; 1982 HARv. Note, supra note 1, at 1936; UCLA Comment, supra note 1,
at 1263; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 627; see case cited in supra note 21.
This definition also includes the hybrid situation called "pendent party" jurisdiction.
A pendent plaintiff is one who appends a nonfederal claim to another plaintiff's federal
claim against the same defendant. A pendent defendant is one against whom a plaintiff
appends a nonfederal claim to a federal claim against another defendant. See, e.g., 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 98; Freer, supra note 1, at 61;
Miller, supra note 1, at 11; Minahan, supra note 1, at 280, 305; Schenkier, supra note 1,
at 245 n.4, 275; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 927 n.11, 929; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 895;
UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1278; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 627-28.
23. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.12, at 66; Freer,
supra note 1, at 34 n.l; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1401 n.1;
Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 104 n.l; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 898; 1982 HARv.
Note, supra note 1, at 1936-37; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1263; see case cited in
supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.13, at
66; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 96; Freer, supra note
1, at 36; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 155; Miller, supra note 1, at 1; Minahan, supra
note 1, at 280, 322; 1982 HARv. Note, supra note 1, at 1937; UCLA Comment, supra note
1, at 1264; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 269; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 642.
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The authority for pendent jurisdiction supposedly originated in 1824,
with the venerable case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States.25 In
particular, scholars find authority for the doctrine in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's language in Osborn:
that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of
law may be involved in it.26
Osborn, however, did not involve a state claim that was pendent to a
federal claim. Instead, plaintiff had only one claim, which involved both
state and federal questions. The issue in Osborn was simply whether a
federal court could decide only the federal questions, rather than all the
issues, in the case. Because the Constitution gave the federal courts power
over "cases" rather than "questions, ' 27 the only sensible result was to let
the federal court decide the nonfederal issues (such as fact disputes), as
well as the federal issues, in a case before it.2 Thus, many writers consider
this result to be mandated by necessity. 29
Modern jurists believe that in 1909 the Supreme Court, relying on the
rule stated in Osborn, first exercised pendent jurisdiction. The later case,
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,° unlike Osborn, did involve a
pendent state claim. In the federal claim, plaintiff alleged that a state
statute violated the United States Constitution. In the state claim, plaintiff
25. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251 (1824); see, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-9
(1976); Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1193 (5th Cir. 1975);
Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530, 541 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929
(1964); Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.12, at 66; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 19, at
103; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 95, 117, §§ 3562,
3567; Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA.
L. REV. 343, 357 (1985); Freer, supra note 1, at 49; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case, "
supra note 1, at 1409-11; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 118; Miller, supra note 1, at
1; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 246; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 925; UCLA Comment, supra
note 1, at 1267; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 629 n.15.
26. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 251, 257-58 (1824).
27. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
28. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 257 (judicial power extended to whole case as
expressed by Constitution).
29. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.13, at
68-69; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 104; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note
1, at 1409; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 151, 153; Miller, supra note 1, at 1; Minahan,
supra note 1, at 285, 289; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1264-67.
30. 213 U.S. 175 (1909); see, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra
note 20, § 2.13, at 69; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 19, at 103-04; Matasar, "One
Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1410; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 116-17;
Schenkier, supra note 1, at 246 n.8; Sullivan, supra note I, at 925-26; B.U. Note, supra
note 1, at 898 n.10; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1267 n.25.
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alleged that the action taken by a state commission was unauthorized by
the state statute. 31 The Siler Court held that:
having properly obtained [jurisdiction], [a federal] court had the
right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided
the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even
if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local
or state questions only.32
Thus, a federal court may decide a state claim appended to a federal
claim. By so holding, the Supreme Court was able to avoid a decision of
federal constitutional law. The opinion therefore has been cited as reflect-
ing wise judicial restraint.
33
In 1933 the Supreme Court applied the Siler rule to a nonconstitutional
case. In Hum v. Oursler3 4 the Court had to decide whether a federal court
could exercise jurisdiction over a state claim for unfair competition ap-
pended to a federal claim for copyright infringement. The Supreme Court
read the rule in Siler broadly. A federal court "having acquired jurisdiction
by reason of the federal questions involved, 'had the right to decide all
the questions in the case . . . . 3 There is no limitation as to the subject
matter of the federal claim. The state claim simply has to be part of a
federal case. A case, the Court said, included "two distinct grounds in
support of a single cause of action."3 6 Because the state claim in Hum
was merely a "different epithet[]" 37 for the federal cause of action,38 the
federal court could hear both claims. Scholars opine that this result is
justified only on the basis of "procedural convenience."
'39
Commentators assert that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has a
completely different history. This doctrine supposedly stems from the 1861
31. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 190-91 (1909).
32. Id. at 191.
33. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTALU, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.13, at
69; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1427 n.117; Matasar, Primer,
supra note 1, at 115, 126 n.106, 152; Minahan, supra note 1, at 290; Sullivan, supra note
1, at 926, 940, 960; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 629.
34. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
35. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 243 (quoting Siler, 213 U.S. at 191).
36. Id. at 246.
37. Id.
38. Id. Plaintiffs actually had two claims for unfair competition. One was based on
a copyrighted version of their play; the other referred to an uncopyrighted version. The
Supreme Court held that the latter claim was not part of the same case as the federal
copyright claim, and thus a federal court could not hear that claim. Id. at 248.
39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 19, at 104; accord, J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE &
A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.13, at 68; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note
1, at 1405-06 n.5; Miller, supra note 1, at 2-3; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 249; Shakman,
supra note 1, at 266; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1268; VA. Note, supra note 1, at
270.
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case of Freeman v. Howe.40 In Freeman a New Hampshire citizen com-
menced a federal diversity action at law against a Massachusetts railroad.
"The suit was commenced in the usual way, by process of attachment
and summons." '4' Therefore, the federal marshal, Watson Freeman, at-
tached several of the defendant's railroad cars. Several mortgagees of the
railroad, who were also from Massachusetts, instituted a replevin action
in state court to recover the cars from the marshal.
42
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the mortgagees could not get
replevin because the state court could not order the property seized from
the custody of the federal court. 43 The mortgagees were not remediless,
however. They could file a bill on the equity side of the federal court to
restrain the suit at law until their claims to the cars were decided. The
federal court could hear their bill, even though it had no independent
grounds for federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noted that:
The principle is, that a bill filed on the equity side of the
court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same
court, and thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage
under mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but ancillary
and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit, out of
which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. 44
Historians of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction generally believe that,
in its early form, it was principally used, as in Freeman, to provide a
forum for claimants to property in the custody of a federal court. These
scholars say that the jurisdiction was exercised only to "prevent injustice
' 45
and, therefore, refer to it as a doctrine of necessity.
46
40. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); see, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976); Pearce v.
United States, 450 F. Supp. 613, 615 n.4 (D. Kan. 1978); Maltais v. United States, 439 F.
Supp. 540, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note
20, § 2.14, at 75; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 28-29; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 87; Freer, supra note 1, at 50; Matasar, "One Constitutional
Case," supra note 1, at 1410; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 117; Schenkier, supra note
1, at 248 n.29; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 898 n.11; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at
1265-66; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 267; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 639-40. Some scholars
trace the original authority for the Freeman decision back to Osborn. These scholars,
however, maintain that the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed sepa-
rately thereafter. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, §
2.13, at 69; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1401 n.1, 1410; Matasar,
Primer, supra note 1, at 116-17; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 279; UCLA Comment, supra
note 1, at 1267.
41. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 453 (1861).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 461.
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.14, at
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The Supreme Court is said to have expanded the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction in 1926, in the oft-cited case of Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange.47 In Moore plaintiff filed a bill on the equity side of the federal
court, alleging a violation of the antitrust laws. Defendant responded with
a nonfederal counterclaim. The district court dismissed the bill and granted
the injunction prayed for in the counterclaim. The circuit court affirmed
both orders on appeal.
48
The Supreme Court had to decide if the counterclaim needed inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds. The Court held that it did not. In so
doing, the Court implied that any compulsory counterclaim, that is, one
''arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit,'' 4 9
need not have an independent jurisdictional basis.50 Because the counter-
claim arose out of the transaction that was the subject of the bill, the
federal court could decide it.
The result in Moore, the theory holds, indicated a shift away from
the limited application of ancillary jurisdiction only to cases of necessity.
After Moore ancillary jurisdiction could be used to hear any nonfederal
claims that were transactionally related to federal claims. The new doctrine
merely serves the convenience of the litigants and does not protect their
property rights, or so the commentators say.
5'
The Supreme Court has based the modern doctrines of "pendent"
and "ancillary" jurisdiction on this history.5 2 Accepting the supposed
historical distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the Court
has quesioned "whether there are any 'principled' differences between"53
76, 80; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 29; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3523, at 85, 87; Freer, supra note 1, at 50; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case, "
supra note 1, at 1411; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 153; Minahan, supra note I, at
285, 293; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 925; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 267, 268, 270.
47. 270 U.S. 593 (1926); see, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra
note 20, § 2.14, at 76; C. WRIoH, supra note 6, § 9, at 29; Freer, supra note 1, at 51;
Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1411; UCLA Comment, supra note
1, at 1266.
48. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926).
49. Fed. R. Equity 30, 226 U.S. 649, 657 (1912).
50. Moore, 270 U.S. at 609. The Court's implication appears from the statement that
"we need not consider the point that, under the second branch [i.e., permissive counter-
claims], federal jurisdiction independent of the original bill must appear . . . ." Id.
51. See, e.g., J. FRiEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.14, at
76; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 30; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3523, at 95; Freer, supra note 1, at 51-52; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case,"
supra note 1, at 1411-12; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 142; Miller, supra note 1, at
1-2, 5; Minahan, supra note 1, at 281 & n.8, 299; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 277; Shakman,
supra note 1, at 279; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 949; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at
1266; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 268; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 643.
52. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1976); see also Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1978) (accepting without question law set out in
Aldinger).
53. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13 (1976); accord, Owen, 437 U.S. at 370 (doctrines are two
species of same generic problem).
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the two doctrines. Some commentators have suggested that, therefore, the
distinction is no longer relevant.5 4 The Supreme Court has, however,
staunchly refused to merge the two doctrines."
The Court's most recent test for pendent jurisdiction, found in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs,56 rejected the Hum equation of "case" with
"cause of action."' 57 The Gibbs Court considered the concept "cause of
action" to be out of date and problematic. 8 Instead, the Court held that
a federal court could hear a pendent nonfederal claim if:
[t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power
in federal courts to hear the whole.
5 9
In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger60 the Court noted the
longstanding division between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and de-
veloped a modern test for the latter. The Court suggested, but did not
decide, that the Gibbs test applied to ancillary jurisdiction as well.6' The
Court added the following two requirements, however:
Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination
[1] of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and
[2] of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal
claim, in order to determine whether "Congress in [that statute]
has ... expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of
jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim.
6 2
54. See, e.g., Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 189; Minahan, supra note 1, at 322;
1982 HARv. Note, supra note 1, at 1947, 1953; UCLA Comment, supra note 1, at 1287;
VA. Note, supra note 1, at 271, 273; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 643.
55. Owen, 437 U.S. at 370; Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13; see infra note 65.
56. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
57. See text accompanying supra note 36.
58. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722-23 (quoting United States v.
Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933)) (footnotes omitted).
59. 383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis in original). The exercise of this jurisdiction is discre-
tionary, however. The Supreme Court listed a number of factors for a federal court to
consider in its decision whether to exercise jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim. Id. at
726-27. For a fuller discussion of Gibbs, see infra notes 477-91 and accompanying text.
60. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
61. The Court refused to decide whether the Gibbs test applied. The Court felt such
decision was unnecessary for the holding in Owen. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978).
62. Id. at 373 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). The Supreme
Court drew Owen's statutory requirement from an earlier case, Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976). Aldinger dealt with the hybrid situation called "pendent party" jurisdiction.
See supra note 22. For a fuller discussion of Owen and Aldinger, see infra notes 492-511
and accompanying text.
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The Court gave no satisfactory explanation for the added requirements
for ancillary jurisdiction. The Owen Court seemed troubled by the potential
expansion of the federal court's limited jurisdiction merely for the con-
venience of the litigants. 63 In particular, the Court was reluctant to allow
a plaintiff, rather than "a defending party haled into court against his
will," 64 to cause that expansion. But that does not explain why these new
hurdles do not also apply to pendent jurisdiction, 65 through which a federal
court expands its jurisdiction at the request of a plaintiff. 66 This state of
affairs, unfortunately, has drawn criticism from scholars6 7 and confused
the courts.6
8
63. Owen, 437 U.S. at 372.
64. Id. at 376.
65. The lower federal courts are not in total agreement on this point. Some courts
have suggested that the added requirements of Aldinger, see supra note 62, and Owen apply
also to pendent claim jurisdiction. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 76 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 1982);
Limerick v. Greenwald, 666 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Sullivan, supra note 1,
at 954; 1982 HARv. Note, supra note 1, at 1943, 1954; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 275.
Other courts, however, apply the Gibbs test to pendent claims, reserving the Gibbs-cum-
Aldinger-and-Owen test to determine pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1983); Williams
v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1379 (l1th Cir. 1982); North Dakota v. Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co., Fargo, N.D., 634 F.2d 368, 370-72 (8th Cir. 1980); National Bank &
Trust Co. of South Bend v. United States, 589 F.2d 1298, 1305 (7th Cir. 1978); Pitrone v.
Mercadante, 572 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Minahan, supra note 1, at 312; B.U.
Note, supra note 1, at 925-26, 929.
The Supreme Court, however, has never used the Aldinger and Owen limitations in
determing pendent claim jurisdiction. In fact, recently the Court implied that the new
requirements do not apply to pendent claims. In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 108
S. Ct. 614 (1988), the Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,
mentioning only Gibbs. The only inquiry was whether the federal and nonfederal claims
arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact. There was no inquiry as to whether the
jurisdictional statute expressly negated jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim or parties, as
required by both Aldinger and Owen. See id. at 618-19. Even the dissent did not disagree
with the majority's statement of the test for pendent jurisdiction. See id. at 622-26 (White,
J., dissenting).
Even more recently, the Supreme Court stated expressly that it meant to "retain that
line" between those cases to which Gibbs alone applies and those to which the Aldinger-
Owen limitations apply. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (1989). The Court
noted that a Gibbs-type case is "fundamentally different" from a pendent party case. Id.
at 2006. The Court summarized the Gibbs test, id., and, quite adamantly, stated that "we
have no intent to limit or impair" that test, id. at 2010.
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 779; Freer, supra note 1, at 36, 67, 69, 74;
Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1405 & n.5, 1417; Matasar, Primer,
supra note 1, at 169, 175-76, 189; Miller, supra note 1, at 10; Minahan, supra note 1, at
318, 319, 322; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 247, 258, 260, 283, 305; B.U. Note, supra note
1, at 925, 930; 1982 HAv. Note, supra note 1, at 1935, 1950, 1953; VA. Note, supra note
1, at 273; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 628, 648.
68. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 1, at 34, 69, 74; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at
133, 167, 190; Minahan, supra note 1, at 306, 309, 317; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 305;
B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 899, 922; 1982 HAlv. Note, supra note 1, at 1935, 1953; VA.
Note, supra note 1, at 265.
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B. The Flaws
Seeking a principled approach to the doctrine, one hopes to find a
solution beyond the conventional wisdom in the "seminal" cases them-
selves. Instead of finding a solution, however, one is struck by the many
unanswered questions the cases pose. For example, if Moore expanded
and applied the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, why was the term
"ancillary" never used in the case? Why did the Moore Court not cite
Freeman? For that matter, why should we consider the jurisdiction applied
in Moore and Freeman to be the same? In Moore jurisdiction was extended
to a defendant's compulsory counterclaim in the same suit69 as the plain-
tiff's claim. In Freeman jurisdiction was extended to a separate bill in
equity by strangers to the law suit. Modern scholars have never satisfac-
torily answered these questions.
70
Turning to the pendent jurisdiction cases, one finds similar questions.
The opinion in Siler did not cite Osborn or use the term "pendent."
Moreover, Hum did not refer to the jurisdiction it applied as "pendent."
In fact, no reported federal court opinion used the term "pendent" to
describe jurisdiction until 1942.7' Finally, although modern scholars aver
that the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction were, in the past,
very different,72 the Supreme Court clearly did not think so. In Hum,
uniformly classified as a pendent jurisdiction case, 73 the Court unequivo-
cally stated: "We think the question there [in Moore] and the one here,
in principle, cannot be distinguished." 74
The confused reader turns hopefully to the earlier cases, looking for
some answers to these questions. Unfortunately, the reader finds only
more questions. The text of the "first" cases to adopt the doctrines
actually contains evidence that their age is greater than has been reported.
For example, Justice Johnson, in his dissent in Osborn, expressed surprise
that Chief Justice Marshall felt the need to address the doctrine. Johnson
69. For the purposes of this article, "suit" and "case" will not be used synonymously.
The term "suit" will be used to denote a litigative unit, as shaped and limited by the rules
of procedure. The term "case" will be used to denote the scope of a controversy to which
a court's jurisdiction extends. See infra notes 261-312 and accompanying text. A case may
include more than one suit. For example, a suit to recover damages and a subsequent suit
to enforce the judgment obtained in the first may be considered part of the same case, but
are nonetheless regarded as separate suits.
70. For an answer to these questions, see infra notes 338-49 and accompanying text.
71. Judge Learned Hand first used the term "pendent jurisdiction" in Pure Oil Co.
v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1942). This assertion is based on the following
LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file, search: "Date bef (1943) and pendent w/5 (claim or
jurisdiction)."
72. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 762 n.24; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at
119, 152; Miller, supra note 1, at 2; Minahan, supra note 1, at 292, 302; Schenkier, supra
note 1, at 246; Shakman, supra note 1, at 263, 286; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 926; VA.
Note, supra note 1, at 269.
74. Hum, 289 U.S. at 242.
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noted that counsel had certainly not argued the point and then exclaimed:
"No one can question, that the court which has juridiction of the principal
question, must exercise jurisdiction over every question.""1
5
Likewise, in Freeman when the Supreme Court discussed the doctrine,
it quoted a twelve-year-old case that noted, " 'It is a doctrine of law too
long established to require citation of authorities, that where a court has
jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the
cause .... " -76 Moreover, in discussing the supposedly novel procedure
to present the nonfederal claim to the federal court, the Freeman Court
chided that anyone "familiar with the practice of the Federal courts
[would] have found no difficulty" in knowing what to do.7
What then was the origin of the doctrine? The narrow focus of modern
legal historians on the American federal courts78 has caused them to end
their inquiry in 1824, long after the doctrine had evolved. The persistence
of this narrow view has led scholars to ignore evidence of the doctrine's
age and origin. For example, in 1866 the Supreme Court, in passing,
restated the rule that "the court first obtaining jurisdiction of a cause has
a right to decide every issue arising in the progress of the cause .. . 79
The Court then remarked that:
It is scarcely necessary to observe that the rule thus announced is
one which has often been held by this and other courts, and which
is essential to the correct administration of justice in all countries
where there is more than one court having jurisdiction of the same
matters.8 0
Thus the problem of dealing with claims brought in one court that
are normally outside its jurisdiction is not new. Moreover, the problem is
not distinctly federal, nor is it distinctly American. Any court system that
distributes its jurisdiction to more than one court must address the prob-
lem. The problem created by such a system is actually twofold. First,
there is a potential for unseemly conflict between courts over cases that
contain elements within the jurisdiction of separate courts. Second, there
is a potential for unfairness to litigants if their cases must be split between
courts. The American response attempted to lessen both these evils. Despite
the newness of the federal dimension of the problems, the early United
States jurists did not devise their solution without help. They looked to
their Mother Country,8' which had been dealing with these problems for
centuries. We must, therefore, turn to medieval and early modern English
75. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
76. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 457 (quoting Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 612, 621 (1849)).
77. Id. at 460.
78. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
79. Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 344 (1866).
80. Id. at 345.
81. See infra notes 179-246 and accompanying text.
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practice for the origins of the American version of the doctrine.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE-ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS 2
The English court "system" 8 3 was much more tangled than the Amer-
ican system ever was. It consisted of, first, many local courts of conflicting
jurisdiction, some dating from even before the Norman Conquest. s4 In
addition, there were three separate common law courts at Westminster."5
There were also the equity courts, Chancery 6 and the equity side of the
82. The purpose of this article is not to recount in detail the history of the English
court system. That has already been done thoroughly elsewhere. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 1-192 (2d ed. 1979); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MNTARMS *22-85; 4 id. at *258-79; M. HASTINGS, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN
FIFTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1947); I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(A.L. Goodhart, H.G. Hanbury & S.B. Chrimes 7th rev. ed. 1956); S.F.C. MsssoM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 11-96 (2d ed. 1981); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 527-688 (2d ed. 1968); 2 id. at 558-672; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (G.J. Hand & D.J. Bentley 6th ed.
1977); Chrimes, Introductory Essay to 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra.
83. One historian referred to the seventeenth-century English legal system as a "patch-
work quilt," noting that " 'the English are past masters at holding together odd bits and
pieces of incompatible systems and at drawing lines that seem quite arbitrary even to
sympathetic friends.' " J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 7 (Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court Vol. 1, 1971) (footnote omitted)
(quoting B. MINCHIN, OUTWARD AND VISIBLE 343 (1961)).
84. There were:
myriad inferior courts that administered local enactments and a variety of usages,
some of great antiquity, some reflecting, ofttimes clumsily, central court law.
These were the courts frequented by masses of people for reasons of convenience
and ecomony or because, as in the case of tenant farmers, they would otherwise
have been remediless.
J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 5. It is difficult to make any generalizations about the business
of these courts. They varied from century to century, as well as borough to borough. They
dealt, inter alia, with matters of purely local interest, such as certain property disputes, and
with petty litigation. For more information about English local courts in the medieval and
early modern periods, see J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 4-15, 18-27; 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 82, at *32-37; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 3-193; S.F.C. MsaSoM, supra
note 82, at 11-31, 50-52; 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 82, at 527-688; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 21-24, 35-45, 70-73, 75-79; Beckerman, The Forty-
Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval English Personal Actions, in LEGAL HISTORY STmsS
1972, at 110 (1975); Chrimes, supra note 82, at 1*-29*. See also D. KONIG, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: EssEx COUNTY, 1629-1692, at 3-34 (1979).
85. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 35; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *38, *41;
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 196, 233; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 56 & n.1.
The common law courts occasionally sat in other places. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82,
at *41; M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 20-22; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 196,
233; see S.F.C. MrLsoM, supra note 82, at 56 n.1. For a discussion of the jurisdiction of
these courts, see infra notes 90-132 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of the history and development of Chancery, see J.H. BAKER,
supra note 82, at 83-97; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *46-55; I W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 82, at 395-476; S.F.C. MmsoM, supra note 82, at 82-96; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE &
G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 113-54; Chrimes, supra note 82, at 53*-57*. For a discussion
of Chancery's use of the doctrine, see infra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
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Court of Exchequer. 7 Finally, there were several courts with special
jurisdiction, such as the Court of Admiralty and the ecclesiastical courts."'
Then, as now, cases did not always fit into neat single-issue packages. 9
The English, however, developed jurisdictional rules that lessened the twin
evils of a divided court system. Each of the major courts had different
procedural constraints. These constraints affected the nature of the juris-
diction exercised by each court over questions normally outside its com-
petence. Each court, however, devised a solution that avoided conflict
with the others, while ensuring fairness to the litigants.
A. The Common Law Courts
The three great common law courts of medieval and early modern 9°
Britain were the Court of Common Pleas, the King's 91 Bench, and the
Court of Exchequer. Their origins are distant and not entirely clear. 92 "By
87. The Court of Exchequer also had a common law side. See infra notes 102-03 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the equity side of the Court of Exchequer, see 3
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *43-46; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 240-42;
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 122, 171-72; Bryson, The Equity Juris-
diction of the Exchequer, in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES 1972, at 118 (1975). The jurisdiction
of this court, however, " '... never rivalled that of the chancery in size or in significance.' "
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 172 (quoting W.H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY
SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER 33 (1975)); see also S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 82, at 62 (doings
of Court of Exchequer had no particular influence on legal development). The equity side
of this court, therefore, will not be discussed further in this article.
88. There were a number of courts with a very specialized jurisdiction. With the
exception of Admiralty, see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text, they did not have
any real counterparts in the American court system and will therefore not be dealt with in
this article. For a discussion of these courts, see J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 101-14; 3
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *62-85; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 526-632;
S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 82, at 23-25; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at
229-56; Chrimes, supra note 82, at 62*-77*.
89. Due to procedural constraints, the medieval litigant was at more of a disadvantage
in this regard than a modern one. Under old common law practice:
the parties were compelled to frame with great exactness the precise issue which
they wished to submit to the adjudication of the court, and all pleadings were
bound to end in a single "issue," either of law or of fact, to be decided in the
first case by the judgment of the court, and in the second by a verdict of a jury.
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 178 (footnote omitted).
90. "[I]n 1875, the courts ... were abolished and their jurisdiction transferred to a
single High Court." J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 47.
91. Between 1400 and 1800, queens ruled, or co-ruled, England for 68 years. Mary I
ruled alone from 1553-1554, and with Philip from 1554-1558. Elizabeth I ruled from 1558-
1603. The second Mary ruled with William from 1689-1694. Anne ruled from 1702-1714.
Id. at xxvii-xxviii. The King's Bench, however, was not renamed during any of their reigns.
Only under Victoria (1837-1901) was this court quite commonly called the "Queen's Bench,"
though it was also sometimes called the "King's Bench."
92. For a detailed history of the development of the common law courts, see id. at
11-27, 34-48; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *37-46; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
82, at 194-264; S.F.C. MiTsoM, supra note 82, at 31-81; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS,
supra note 82, at 52-65, 155-88; Chrimes, supra note 82, at 29*-38*.
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1400, [however,] . . . the three common law courts are completely separate
bodies, each with its own set of records and its own forms of procedure. ' 93
Because the topic of this article is how separate courts deal with overlap-
ping jurisdiction, the inquiry will begin at that point.
The Court of Common Pleas had exclusive jurisdiction over "common
pleas," that is, actions between subject and subject. Thus:
[t]he court was the only one of the courts of common law in
which real actions and the older personal actions of debt detinue,
account, and covenant could be begun; and its jurisdiction over
them could only be ousted by express words of exclusion in a
charter or other instrument granting this jurisdiction to another
court.
9 4
This exclusive jurisdiction was mandated by a document no less revered
than the United States Constitution, to wit, Magna Carta. 95 Clause 17
required that common pleas be heard in one fixed location, rather than
in a court that followed the monarch from place to place. 96 Because neither
King's Bench nor the Exchequer were by law held in one place, they were
forbidden by Magna Carta from hearing common pleas. 97
The jurisdiction of the King's Bench was much narrower than Common
Pleas. King's Bench had jurisdiction over matters in which a personal
wrong or force was alleged. 98 It naturally had a criminal jurisdiction.99 In
93. G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 64; accord, J.H. BAKER, supra
note 82, at 35, 44; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 195-96, 206-07, 232; S.F.C.
MILSOM, supra note 82, at 32.
94. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 198 (footnotes omitted); accord, J.H. BAKER,
supra note 82, at 35; M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 16; S.F.C. MILsom, supra note 82, at
52; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 56.
95. Magna Carta has been described as "a sacred text, the nearest approach to an
irrepealable 'fundamental statute' that England has ever had." 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 82, at 173.
96. "Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be held in some definite
place." Magna Carta 1215, cl. 17, reprinted in I SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 118 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham ed. & trans. rev. ed. 1972). The quoted language
appeared in clause 11 of the Magna Carta of 1225. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 17 n.12;
S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 52 n.l. The Magna Carta of 1215 is referred to as the
"historian's Magna Carta," while the issue of 1225, in which it took permanent shape, is
referred to as the "lawyer's Magna Carta." G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82,
at 52 n.1.
97. At the time Magna Carta was first signed, this clause was not meant as a direct
attack on the jurisdiction of the King's Bench or Exchequer. Its purpose was to guarantee
a stationary forum for individual litigants. Gradually, however, the principle developed that
common pleas could not be directed to any court but the Court of Common Pleas. J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 36, 44; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 35, 52; see G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 49, 56; Chrimes, supra note 82, at 36*; see also
M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 22 (literal-minded reverence for Magna Carta in seventeenth
century).
98. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 219.
99. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 35; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *265-67;
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addition, the civil side heard actions of trespass and private criminal
actions.'00 Because these civil actions were between subject and subject,
the jurisdiction of the King's Bench over them was concurrent with that
of Common Pleas. 0 1
The jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer was narrower still. The
Exchequer was the royal department of finance. The Court of Exchequer
developed to deal with litigation concerning with the collection of the
monarch's revenue.1 0 2 The court's jurisdiction was initially "limited almost
entirely to the hearing of revenue cases.''103
Then, as now, however, disputes did not always come in neat, juris-
dictional packages. For example, let's say that Tom owes money to Dick,
but refuses to pay. When Dick goes to Tom's home to try to collect the
money, an altercation ensues, during which Tom injures Dick. Dick brings
his trespass action in the King's Bench.' 4 Will Dick have to bring his debt
action in Common Pleas, thus being forced not only to pay the cost of
initiating two law suits, but also to litigate in two courts at once?
For a second example, let's say that Anne owes money to the sovereign.
She is accordingly brought before the Court of Exchequer. But she is
unable to pay her debt because Mary- has not paid the money she owes
to Anne. 0 5 Will Anne have to bring her debt action in Common Pleas,
thus being forced to collect the money to pay the sovereign's claim in a
separate court?
Because a plaintiff had to go to Chancery to purchase a writ in order
to commence any suit in Common Pleas,'0 6 Dick and Anne would face
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 212-18; S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 82, at 53. Although
the King's Bench "had unlimited criminal jurisdiction throughout the realm[,] ... after the
fourteenth century it acted as a court of first instance in Middlesex cases only." J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 35. (Middlesex is county that includes Westminster. Id. at 39;
S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 34-35.)
100. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 35; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *42; 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 212; S.F.C. MiLSOM, supra note 82, at 53; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE
& G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 59. The court also entertained suits to correct the errors of
other courts.
101. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 35; M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 16; 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 219; S.F.C. MiLsoM, supra note 82, at 53-54, 63; G.R.Y.
RADCL=FE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 56-57, 59. In the fourteenth century, King's Bench
had unsuccessfully attempted to make its jurisdiction over trespass actions exclusive. M.
HAsTINGs, supra note 82, at 24.
102. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 44; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 42-44;
S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 82, at 32; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 57.
103. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 233; accord, J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at
45; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *44-45; Wurzel, The Origin and Development of
Quo Minus, 49 YALE L.J. 39, 39 (1939).
104. The Court of Common Pleas had concurrent jurisdiction over trespass actions.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Dick, however, might prefer to go to King's
Bench because its process was so much less expensive and time-consuming than that of
Common Pleas. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
105. This plea was very frequently raised. G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note
82, at 57.
106. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 49-50; M. HASTnGS, supra note 82, at 16, 19, 158;
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increased cost, 0 7 risk, 08 and delay'09 if forced to bring a second suit in
Common Pleas." 0 Moreover, the second suit might cause unseemly conflict
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 396; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 35, 36, 37;
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 55, 79.
107. There was a substantial fee for an original writ from Chancery. M. HASTINGS,
supra note 82, at 25-26, 161-62; see J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 50; S.F.C. MiLsom,
supra note 82, at 60, 64; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 78. The fee
varied depending on the value of plaintiff's demand. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 40; M.
HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 161.
108. There was a certain risk in the purchase of a writ. There were about 500 types of
writs. G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 79. Choosing the wrong one would
be fatal to the plaintiff's case. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 40 n.12, 52, 59; S.F.C.
MiLsom, supra note 82, at 35, 64; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 46, 80-
81, 156.
109. The original writ did not in itself grant jurisdiction to the Court of Common
Pleas. Rather, it ordered the sheriff to commence process against the defendant. The sheriff
then endorsed the writ, describing the action he had taken, and returned it to Common
Pleas. The court now had jurisdiction over the suit. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 50; see
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 164.
Unfortunately, the case was probably not yet ready for the pleading stage. The sheriff
often was unable to procure the appearance of the defendant on the first writ. There was,
therefore, need for various mesne, or intermediate, writs. G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS,
supra note 82, at 165. There were three main types of mesne process: attachment, by which
the sheriff got pledges for the appearance of the defendant; distringas, by which the sheriff
was empowered to seize property of the defendant; and capias, by which the sheriff was
authorized to seize the person of the defendant. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 52; 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *279-84; see G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82,
at 165-66. The capias was the most effective means of service because it physically brought
the defendant before the court. Id. at 166; see M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 171-12
(capias not more efficient, but only way to proceed against party who had nothing that
could be distrained). But see J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 52-53 (sheriff, who was liable
for any mistakes, often did not attempt to seize defendant); M. HASTINGS, supra note 82,
at 162-64 (sheriff's office often embezzled writs). Unfortunately, for most actions, the capias
was not immediately available. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 53. For example, in a debt
action, the capias could only be used after futile attempts to make the defendant appear by
using attachment and distringas. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, app. III, § 2; S.F.C.
MILSOM, supra note 82, at 64; see G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 165-
66. For a detailed discussion of the costs of, and the delays caused by, mesne process, see
M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 169-83. However, possibly in an effort to make itself more
competitive with the other common law courts, cf. infra notes 124-25 and accompanying
text (easier process of King's Bench and Exchequer), Common Pleas, by the end of the
fifteenth century, allowed most actions to be commenced with a capias. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 82, at *281-82, *285-86; J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 512; M. HASTINGS, supra
note 82, at 163, 169-70, 171 n.10; I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 222; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 166.
The delay was exacerbated by the limited times for the sheriff's return of a writ. The
court sat in fixed terms. In Elizabeth I's reign (1558-1603), the court sat only ninety-nine
days of the year. Through later reforms, the court lost about ten more days. If one form
of mesne process was unsuccessful, the case would be continued to a "return" day in the
next term. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 53. "It was not uncommon for a year or two to
pass before a defendant appeared." Id. at 54; accord, M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 23.
For a list of return days, see id. app. IV.
110. These concerns are not unlike those of the modern federal court litigant who has
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between the courts. The process generally used to commence a suit was
either the arrest of the defendant (capias) or the distraint of his or her
property (distringas)."1' To allow one court to seize a person or property
in the custody of another would be detrimental to the orderly administra-
tion of justice. Fortunately for the litigants and the courts, the answer to
both hypothetical questions was "no."
The basic rule was as follows: "there is no Court that suffers its
process either to be insulted or to be materially interrupted; and whenever
this is attempted, it is a contempt .... 112 Thus, "to prevent the incon-
venience which would arise if plaintiffs could have [prisoners in the custody
of one court] arrested and moved into other courts,""' once a defendant
was seized by one court, no other court could arrest that defendant."
'4
A person with a claim against the defendant that was outside the
jurisdiction of the arresting court was not left remediless, however. Each
of the common law courts had a jurisdiction based on privilege which, in
the fifteenth century, was already considered ancient, "from time beyond
memory." ' s Thus:
a related state claim. See, e.g., Acton Co. of Massachusetts v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668
F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1982); Lentino v. Fringe Employment Plans, 611 F.2d 474, 478, 479
n.16 (3d Cir. 1979); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred
Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822,
846 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613, 615, 616 (D. Kan. 1978);
Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 550 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.13, at 68; C. WsuHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 22; 13
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 3523, at 83.
111. See supra note 109.
112. Cawthorne v. Campbell, 1 Anst. 205, 212, 145 Eng. Rep. 846, 849 (Ex. 1790).
113. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 38.
114. M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 19; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 203 &
n.10; G.R.Y. RADCLE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 57; see Wurzel, supra note 103, at
56 n.70.
By the late fifteenth century, most common-law actions were commenced by capias.
See supra note 109 and infra notes 124 & 125. It was the use of this form of process, rather
than distringas, that led to the relevant jurisdictional developments. See infra notes 123-32
and accompanying text. Distringas will therefore not be discussed further. Suffice it to say
that in those cases in which distraint was used, there was also a potential for conflict
between courts. What should happen if one court attempted to seize property that was
already in the custody of another court? The rule was the same as for capias: no court
could wrest the control of the property from the court that first seized it. Taylor v. Carryl,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 594-95 (1858); see Payne v. Drewe, 4 East 523, 545, 102 Eng. Rep.
931, 939 (K.B. 1804); Cawthorne v. Campbell, 1 Anst. 205, 212, 145 Eng. Rep. 846, 849
(Ex. 1790) (citing Rex v. Oliver, Bunbury 14, 145 Eng. Rep. 578 (Ex. 1717)); see also Russell
v. East Anglian Ry., 3 Mac. & G. 104, 115, 117, 42 Eng. Rep. 201, 205, 206 (Ch. 1850)
(Common Pleas unable to seize property under control of Chancery). Those persons whose
property was wrongly seized were not forgotten, however. Remedies were provided for them.
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 52 (suit could be brought against sheriff for wrongful seizure);
M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 179 & n.44 (statutes provided for persons whose goods were
taken erroneously).
115. M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 17 (quoting typical language from plea rolls of
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[i]f either the plaintiff or defendant had a connection with one of
the three common law courts, then any civil proceedings could,
and indeed should, be brought by or against him as the case might
be in that court by a bill, or as we might say, a statement of
claim, presented to the court without the formality of the issue of
a writ from the Chancery to set the court in motion." 6
This connection included being in the custody of the court for another
action. 17 Thus, if the process used to command the appearance of the
defendant was arrest, the privilege would attach." 8 Hence, all litigation
concerning the party could be brought in the court with custody. Because
the process used to begin the initial suits in the two hypothetical cases
would have been capias,119 Anne and Dick were not forced to divide their
litigation between two courts.
This privilege jurisdiction was not limited to the parties to the first
action. Unrelated third parties could take advantage of the privilege. Thus,
in the first hypothetical, if:
Tom who owed a debt to Dick, happened to be in the king's
bench prison at the suit of Harry, Dick could sue for the debt in
the king's bench instead of in the common pleas, could do so
without a writ, and could be sure that the case would be heard
quickly because Tom was immediately available. 120
In fact, "[w]ise attorneys kept a careful watch on the marshal's gaol
calendar, because they might be able to save their own clients' time and
money by taking advantage of process commenced by someone else. '121
The benefits of the privilege jurisdiction were several. First, it helped
prevent conflict among the courts. Second, it assured the protection of
the interests of claimants. Third, because the second action needed no
Court of Common Pleas in fifteenth century); accord, id. at 19; see 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 82, at *42 (court "always" had privilege jurisdiction). It is possible that an
analogous device was used as early as Edward I's reign (1272-1307) to expand the jurisdiction
of another court. I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 219.
116. G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 164-65.
117. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 38; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *45, *285;
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 203 & n.10, 212, 239-40; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note
82, at 62; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 57, 165, 167. It is not clear
whether the action for debt would be allowed in the Exchequer because of privilege, or
because the sovereign had an indirect interest in the suit. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 45;
G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 57-58.
118. The privilege attached even if the defendant were out of the actual custody of the
court on bail. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 38 n.9, 39 n.10; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 82, at *285-86; I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 219-20; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G.
CROSS, supra note 82, at 165, 169.
119. See infra notes 124 & 125.
120. S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 62; see id. at 63.
121. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 38.
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original writ, the second process was much cheaper, more expeditious,
and safer than if it had been started by writ.
122
An important characteristic of the jurisdiction by privilege was that
once it attached, the court did not lose it. Thus, if the original claim was
discontinued, the court did not lose jurisdiction over the second claim,
even if it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court. This
characteristic can be inferred from the various fictions that were developed
to increase the jurisdiction of the King's Bench and Exchequer.
123
Litigation in the King's Bench' 24 and Exchequer' 2 was much easier
and less expensive than in the Court of Common Pleas.1 26 Thus, a party
with two claims would save even more time and money if the original
action could be commenced in the former two courts instead of Common
Pleas. In fact, because the process of Common Pleas was so costly, many
litigants with a common plea engaged in the following practice: (1) file
122. Id. at 40, 53-54; M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 18; S.F.C. Mu~soM, supra note
82, at 64. For a discussion of the problems caused by the original writ, see supra notes 107-
09 and accompanying text.
Although the recognition of privilege jurisdiction made procedure somewhat more
convenient, this is not to say that the parties received the benefits of the modern joinder
rules. Due to procedural constraints, the parties were not allowed to litigate two different
forms of action in the same proceeding. G.R.Y. RADcLuriF & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at
177.
123. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
124. First, plaintiff did not need a writ from Chancery to begin all actions in King's
Bench. If a litigant had an action for trespass that had been committed in the county where
the court sat (usually Middlesex), the action could be commenced by filing a bill, or
statement of claim, directly with the court. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 38; 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *285; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 199-200; S.F.C.
MLsoM, supra note 82, at 34, 54, 63. Thus the risk attached to the writ system was avoided.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Second, proceedings in the King's Bench were less expensive than in Common Pleas.
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 40; 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 82, at 199 & n.9, 219;
G.R.Y. R1 LncUp & G. CRoss, supra note 82, at 171.
Third, in a trespass action, the capias was available immediately, without the previous
use of other mesne writs. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *280; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 82, at 200; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 166, 171; see J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 59; cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text (delay caused by
mesne process).
Fourth, time was further saved because return days were not used in the continuation
of cases in King's Bench. M. HAsTINGS, supra note 82, at 23; see J.H. BAKER, supra note
82, at 54. For the problems caused by the return days in Common Pleas, see supra note
109 and accompanying text.
125. First, "[t]he attraction of the court [of Exchequer] to private litigants needs little
explanation: the methods used by the King to collect his own revenue must be the best."
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 44; accord, Wurzel, supra note 103, at 39, 47-48. Second,
there was never a need for a Chancery writ to begin an action in the Exchequer. J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 44; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 165, 177.
Third, the capias was immediately issued for the defendant. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
82, at *286; G.R.Y. RAcLnF'E & G. CRoss, supra note 82, at 166.
126. For a discussion of the costs of Common Pleas process, see supra notes 107-09
and accompanying text.
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an imaginary claim that was within the jurisdiction of the King's Bench
or Exchequer in such court; (2) once the defendant was in the custody of
the court, file a bill against him or her for, say, debt; and then (3)
discontinue the first suit. This practice was actually less costly than filing
the debt action originally in Common Pleas. 127 King's Bench and Exchequer
allowed such practice, not questioning the disappearance of the imaginary
claim.' 28 In fact, various fictions were devised 129 to allow plaintiffs to use
the more efficient courts. 30 By the seventeenth century, through the use
of these fictions, 3 ' the King's Bench and Exchequer were routinely hearing
127. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 40; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 219.
128. Initially, there was some resistance in King's Bench to the use of fictions. M.
HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 26. By the fifteenth century, however, that court held that it
would not inquire why the defendant was in the custody of the court. J.H. BAKER, supra
note 82, at 39 & n.9. At first, the Court of Exchequer did allow litigants to challenge the
fictitious basis of jurisdiction. By the seventeenth century, however, the court did not allow
a defendant to question the fiction. Id. at 45-46; Wurzel, supra note 103, at 53-61, 64.
129. By the late fifteenth century, litigants had found that they could file a bill in
King's Bench for a fictional trespass supposedly committed in the county in which the court
sat. Plaintiffs thereby avoided the purchase of an original writ and had the advantage of a
capias without other mesne process. See supra note 124. Once the defendant was in the
custody of the court, plaintiff would prefer a bill of, say, debt against the prisoner. Before
trial, "the action of trespass could be quietly discontinued." J.H. BAKER, supra note 82,
at 39. For a detailed discussion of this fiction, referred to as the "Bill of Middlesex," see
id. at 38-40; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *42-43; M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at
25; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 220-22; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 62-65;
G.R.Y. RADcLrn & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 166-68.
In the Exchequer, debtors of the King could recover their own debts if they alleged in
their bills of complaint the following: "by reason of the debt or damages due [plaintiff] he
was 'so much the less able to satisfy the lord king of the debts which he owes at the
Exchequer."' J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 45; accord, 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82,
at *45; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CRoss, supra note 82, at 168; Wurzel, supra note 103, at
39. By the seventeenth century, the allegation of a debt to the King was commonly fictitious.
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 45-46; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *4546; 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 240; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 62; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE
& G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 168; Wurzel, supra note 103, at 61, 64.
130. Fairness to litigants was at least one motivating factor behind the courts' acceptance
of the use of fictions. As Blackstone averred:
these fictions of law, though at first they may startle the student, he will find
upon further consideration to be highly beneficial and useful; especially as this
maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work an injury;
its proper operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that
might result from the general rule of law. So true it is, that in fictione juris
semper subsistit aequitas.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *43. The judges' motivation was not completely
altruistic. A considerable portion of their income came from fees. It was, thus, to their
advantage to attract business to their courts. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 254.
131. These fictions became less important later with the development of actions on the
case. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 40-41, 59-60; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at
199, 219; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 61, 67-70; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra
note 82, at 80, 89, 155-63.
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cases that were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Common Pleas.
3 2
To suggest that the medieval privilege jurisdiction was "ancillary" or
"pendent" jurisdiction as we know it today would be hopelessly anach-
ronistic. Certainly, the use of fictions to expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts was rejected very soon after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. 33 The medieval jurisdiction is, however, a direct, albeit distant,
ancestor of the modern doctrine. This relationship is better perceived by
closely examining a nearer relation, the early American doctrine. The early
American courts consciously adopted an approach very similar to the
English solution to ordering relations between courts, while protecting
claimants from unfairness.'3 4 Before turning to the American doctrine,
however, its closer English relations should be examined.
B. Chancery
The procedure in the common law courts was rigid and often led to
unjust results. 35 For example, in 1258 the Provisions of Oxford severely
limited the grant of new writs. 3 6 The types of actions that could be
brought from that time were virtually restricted to those that were available
in 1258.17 In addition, joinder of parties was very limited, thus leading
to a multiplicity of law suits. 31 Moreover, strict rules of evidence often
cut off a party's right to offer proof as to the actual merits of the case.1
39
132. "[B]y the sixteenth century the plea rolls [of the King's Bench] contain a remarkable
proportion of bills complaining of trespasses to land in Westminster or Hendon; the
plaintiffs, of course, always return within a term or two to pursue bills of debt." J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 39; accord, M. HASTINGS, supra note 82, at 16; 1 W. HoLDswoRTH,
supra note 82, at 200, 219; S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 82, at 62, 65-67; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE
& G. CRoss, supra note 82, at 171.
133. See Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 334 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (Iredell,
Cir. J.); see also J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 49.
134. See infra notes 240-42 and 352-65 and accompanying text.
135. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 87; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CRoss, supra note 82,
at 116.
136. The Provisions of Oxford provided, inter alia, "Concerning the chancellor:- ...
merely by the king's will he shall seal nothing out of course [i.e., nothing but routine
documents], but shall do so by [the advice of] the council that surrounds the king." The
Provisions of Oxford (1258), reprinted in 1 SoURcES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY,
supra note 96, at 144-45 (footnote omitted).
137. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 51; S.F.C. MI.soM, supra note 82, at 36; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 79-80. There was a little discretion left to the
clerks in Chancery for devising new writs, " 'whensoever it shall happen that in one case a
writ is found and in like case (in consimili casu) falling under like law and requiring like
remedy is found none.' " Statute of Westminster 11 (1285), quoted in G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE &
G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 80. This power was "little used," however. Id.; accord, J.H.
BAKER, supra note 82, at 51 n.8.
138. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 348-52 (2d ed. 1947).
"Joinder as a procedural device to shorten litigation was not contemplated at common
law." Id. at 352.
139. The stock example was that of the debtor who did not ensure that his sealed
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Very gradually, to correct these procedural defects, the Court of Chancery
developed. 40 By the late fifteenth century, Chancery had become the
fourth central court of England.'
4'
This new court added yet another dimension to the problems of divided
jurisdiction.' 42 What was a litigant who had a case that was part equitable
and part legal to do? If the new court's procedure forced a party to
litigate in two separate tribunals, it might cause injustice similar to that
which Chancery was attempting to lessen. For example, a party who filed
a suit in Chancery, only to find that the case, or part of it, had to be
heard at law, might then be barred by the statute of limitations. 43 A party
with a meritorious claim would, thus, be left remediless because of
procedural rules. To prevent such unfairness to the litigants, Chancery
applied the following maxim: "when a court of equity has jurisdiction
over a cause for any purpose, it may retain the cause for all purposes,
and proceed to a final determination of all the matters at issue."' 44
Following are several examples of the maxim's application. 41
bond was cancelled when he paid up. The law regarded the bond as incontrovertible
evidence of the debt, and so payment was no defence. Here the debtor suffered
the obvious hardship of being driven to pay a second time .... It was not that
the common law held that a debt was due twice .... It was a matter of observing
strict rules of evidence, rules which might exclude the merits of the case from
consideration but which could not be relaxed without destroying certainty and
condoning carelessness.
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 87-88; see also S.F.C. MiLsoM, supra note 82, at 86; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 118-19.
140. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 87; S.F.C. MILSOM, supra note 82, at 82-86; G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 64, 96; see also I J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 192 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941) (1st ed. 1881). Actually, the rise of
Chancery spurred many procedural reforms in the common law courts. J.H. BAKER, supra
note 82, at 36-37; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 120. Unfortunately,
Chancery ultimately developed its own procedural problems. As one historian noted:
It is the height of irony that the court which originated to provide an escape
from the defects of common law procedure should in its later history have
developed procedural defects worse by far than those of the law. For two centuries
before Dickens wrote Bleak House, the word 'Chancery' had been synonymous
with expense, delay and despair.
J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 95.
141. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 84, 87; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note
82, at 117-18. In strict theory, the Chancery did not apply law; it merely ensured that legal
rights were exercised in accordance with good conscience and equity. In effect it came to
apply a form of law.
142. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
143. Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L.
REv. 320, 320 (1951). Moreover, "to turn first to law might, as a simple matter of res
judicata, lose [the plaintiff] the more-desired chancellor's remedy . .. ." Id. (footnote
omitted).
144. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 181, at 257; see also I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 64 k, at 63 (J. Perry 12th ed. 1877 & photo, reprint 1984)
(court with jurisdiction for the purpose of discovery will grant complete relief); Levin, supra
note 143, at 320 (equitable "clean-up" rule allowed award of damages).
145. For more examples of the maxim's application, see 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140,
§§ 231-241.
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Chancery had jurisdiction to order specific performance in certain
contract cases if the damages provided at law were inadequate. 46 In
addition, Chancery sometimes "assumed jurisdiction to award damages in
lieu of specific performance."' 147 The chancellor might decide not to order
specific performance because it was impossible or oppressive. 48 Rather
than leave the plaintiff to pursue an action at law, however, the chancellor
might use the "clean-up" doctrine to award damages. For example,
damages might be appropriate- if the party's inability to perform the
contract had been caused by the party himself or herself. 49 In addition,
when a subsequent event made specific performance oppressive, the chan-
cellor might award damages.
150
The reason cited for the use of clean-up was "to avoid multiplicity
of suits.' 5' Clean-up was not always allowed when specific performance
was denied, however; plaintiffs sometimes were left to their remedy at
law.' 52 This fact suggests that the convenience of the parties was not the
main concern. One scholar has opined that clean-up was available when
specific performance was denied to prevent injustice and "the award of
damages [would] not perpetrate the very injustice which [the] denial ...
[was] intended to prevent.' ' 53 Thus, notions of fairness supported this
extension of Chancery's jurisdiction.
Chancery also had jurisdiction to compel discovery from a party. At
common law, no party could be forced to testify.' 54 Yet, to establish a
claim or defense, one party might need evidence that was within the
exclusive knowledge of an opponent. Chancery allowed the party to file
a bill of discovery to collect that information. 55 To maintain such a bill,
146. Id. § 221b; 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, §§ 716-717. Chancery had initially developed
the remedy of specific performance to give effect to agreements that the common law
refused to recognize. H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PnrNcIPLEs OF EQurry § 53, at
125-26 (2d ed. 1948). By the sixteenth century, the common-law courts allowed new causes
of action that provided relief in such cases. See supra note 13 1. Chancery, however, continued
to award specific performance in appropriate cases. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra.
147. Levin, supra note 143, at 333 (footnote omitted); see 1 J. POMEROY, supra note
144, § 237e.
148. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, § 61; 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, § 714, at 701-
02.
149. Levin, supra note 143, at 333, 334-35; see, e.g., Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. Jr.
395, 400-01, 33 Eng. Rep. 149, 152 (Ch. 1806); Denton v. Stewart, 17 Ves. Jr. 276, 280
n.1, 34 Eng. Rep. 107, 108 n.1 (Ch. 1786).
150. Levin, supra note 143, at 348-49; see, e.g., City of London v. Nash, 3 Atk. 512,
26 Eng. Rep. 1095 (Ch. 1747).
151. Levin, supra note 143, at 325; see 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 237e; 2 J.
STORY, supra note 144, § 797, at 5-6; Levin, supra note 143, at 340.
152. See I J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 237d; Levin, supra note 143, at 340-48.
153. Levin, supra note 143, at 351; accord, 2 J. STORY, supra note 144, §§ 798-799.
154. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, § 206, at 547; see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
82, at *381-82; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 139.
155. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 458; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, §
206, at 547; 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 191; G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, supra
note 82, at 139-40.
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however, the party had to show not only the need for discovery,'56 but
also that the party had a right to the relief claimed in the legal action.
Hence, the litigants would be forced to try the same case in two forums-
one to collect the evidence, the other to resolve the dispute.157 To prevent
a multiplicity of suits: 58
[i]n many cases it has been held, that, where a party has a just
title to come into equity for a discovery, and obtains it, the court
will go on, and give him the proper relief; and not turn him round
to the expenses and inconveniences of a double suit at law. 59
This jurisdiction was not always exercised, however. On the one hand,
complete relief was most often given when the suit was one for an
accounting, fraud, or mistake. 60 To leave a party to an action at law in
those cases would do more than cause inconvenience. The legal remedy in
such cases was incomplete.' 6' On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
legal questions was not exercised "where the remedy at law is more
appropriate than the remedy in equity.' ' 62 Hence, a sense of fairness
determined Chancery's application of the doctrine in these cases.
The concerns evident in Chancery's decision to exercise jurisdiction
over legal questions in the two foregoing examples are claimants' concerns.
The protection of sovereignty, so important to the common law courts, 6 3
is not apparent. Chancery was protective of its sovereignty, though. In
contrast to the usual deference given to the sovereignty of another court,
Chancery actually claimed the power to enjoin the law courts from
proceeding further on matters related to suits in Chancery.6
156. See generally 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, §§ 74-74 e.
157. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, § 206, at 548; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY PLEADINGS § 319 (J. Gould 10th ed. 1892).
158. 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, § 64 k, at 63.
159. Id.; accord, 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 234.
160. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 234, at 420; 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, § 64 k,
at 63.
161. 1 J. STORY, supra note 144, §§ 67-68.
162. Id. § 73, at 70.
163. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
164. The law courts were not very pleased with Chancery's exercise of this power. This
displeasure erupted into the famous dispute between Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench, and the Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, during the reign of James I (1603-1625).
By this time, Chancery issued "common injunctions" restraining a defendant from pursuing
a remedy at common law. In fact, Ellesmere encouraged suits in Chancery after common
law had issued a judgment resolving the dispute. Disobedience of such injunctions was
punished by imprisonment. Coke responded by using habeas corpus to release those whom
Ellesmere had imprisoned for contempt. The dispute was put to the King in 1616. The
resolution devised by the Attorney General, Sir Francis Bacon, allowed Chancery to enjoin
suits and judgments at law, when warranted. These injunctions were, however, directed to
the parties to the litigation only. In other words, Chancery could not order another court
to do or refrain from doing anything. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 92-92; 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 82, at 459-65; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, § 4, at 10-11;
S.F.C. MiLsoM, supra note 82, at 92-93; G.R.Y. RADCLnM & G. CROSS, supra note 82, at
123-25.
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Moreover, clashes between the process of Chancery and that of other
courts occurred on occasion. For example, if a defendant did not appear
in response to a subpoena, 65 the defendant was considered to be in
contempt. Chancery could, inter alia, order some of the defendant's
property sequestered. 166 Once the property was in the custody of Chancery,
the familiar rule 167 applied: no other court could seize it.16s Chancery had
a very effective means to enforce that rule; the court could enjoin sub-
sequent proceedings at law concerning the sequestered property. 69 Those
persons who had claims to the sequestered property were not left without
recourse, however. They could intervene and be heard pro interesse suo.
7 0
Chancery, in deciding the intervenor's interests, would often rule on legal
issues .'7 Chancery's solution thus struck the same balance as that of the
common law courts: protection of sovereignty without causing unfairness
to litigants.
C. Admiralty
Although the Court of Admiralty had a substantial jurisdiction over
commercial cases in the Tudor era, 72 it was never as strong or important
as the four central courts. 7 3 Moreover, by the seventeenth century, the
Court of Admiralty was reduced to hearing cases that, quite literally,
165. The usual method of process in Chancery was the subpoena, rather than arrest or
distraint. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 88; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *442-42;
1 J. STORY, supra note 157, § 44.
166. Sequestration was ordered following unsuccessful attempts to have the defendant
arrested. J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 88 n.13; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *443-
45; see H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, § 39.
167. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
168. Russell v. East Anglian Ry., 3 Mac. & G. 104, 115, 117, 42 Eng. Rep. 201, 205,
206 (Ch. 1850); accord, Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 594-95 (1858); see Payne
v. Drewe, 4 East 523, 545, 102 Eng. Rep. 931, 939 (K.B. 1804).
169. Evelyn v. Lewis, 3 Hare 472, 475, 67 Eng. Rep. 467, 468 (Ch. 1844); Kaye v.
Cunningham, 5 Madd. 406, 56 Eng. Rep. 950 (Ch. 1820); H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146,
§ 169; 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 140, § 236; see generally I J. STORY, supra note 144, §§
874-904. For a discussion of the dispute over this power between Coke and Ellesmere, see
supra note 164.
170. Anonymous, 6 Ves. Jr. 287, 31 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Ch. 1801) (relying on Hamlyn v.
Lee, Dick. 94, 21 Eng. Rep. 203 (Ch. 1743)).
When a person claims to be entitled to an estate, or other property sequestered,
... or has a title paramount to the sequestration, he should apply to the court
to direct an inquiry whether the applicant has any, and what, interest in the
property; and this inquiry is called an "examination pro interesse suo."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1091.
171. Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. Jr. 335, 338, 32 Eng. Rep. 632, 633 (Ch. 1804); 1 J.
POMEROY, supra note 140, § 236.
172. The Tudor Era was 1485-1603.
173. For a history of the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty, see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 82, at 544-73. For a briefer history, see J.H. BAKER, supra note 82, at 107-19;
G. GILBERT & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMRALTY § 1-4 (2d ed. 1975); G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE
& G. CROSS, supra note 82, at 246-56.
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involved "a thing done upon the sea."' 74 Thus, for example, "contracts
having a maritime subject-matter but made on land (as most were) were
outside the jurisdiction of the Admiralty.'
1 75
As limited as it was, this court's jurisdiction would not have been
particularly pertinent to the present inquiry. The admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States, however, was not so limited. From colonial times,
American courts of admiralty had a broad, general maritime jurisdiction. 76
There was a distinct possibility that the admiralty jurisdiction over shipping
contracts, for example, might overlap the jurisdiction of the common law.
Thus, an admiralty court might be asked to address issues of common
law and vice versa. When an American court faced that situation, it looked
to English precedent for a solution. 177 Hence, an examination of the
doctrine in the Court of Admiralty is necessary.
Admiralty's solution was very similar to that devised by the central
courts. In the words of Blackstone:
Where the admiral's court hath not original jurisdiction of the
cause, though there should arise in it a question that is proper for
the cognizance of that court, yet that doth not alter nor take away
the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law. And so vice versa,
if it hath jurisdiction of the original, it hath also jurisdiction of
all consequential questions, though properly determinable at com-
mon law. 
78
Counsel cited these very words to the United States Supreme Court in the
first case in which it applied the doctrine. 79 Therefore, it is fitting that
we now turn to an examination of the American version of the doctrine.
III. THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Early American Acceptance of the Doctrine
1. An English Doctrine Is Used To Solve an English Problem
The inquiry into the American version of the doctrine begins in the
late seventeenth century, when the colonies experienced an influx of
174. 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5 (1389), quoted in G. GILBERT & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-
4, at 9. This statute was interpreted narrowly in the seventeenth century. For a discussion
of the Admiralty jurisdiction in the seventeenth century, see Yale, A View of the Admiral
Jurisdiction: Sir Matthew Hale and the Civilians, in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES 1972, at 88
(1975).
175. G. GILBERT & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-4, at 10.
176. When the colonial courts of Vice-Admiralty were established in North America,
they were given a broad general maritime jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, when the admiralty
jurisdiction was established in the federal courts, it was interpreted broadly, rather than
following the narrow English jurisdictional rules. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442-
44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (Story, Cir. J.).
177. See infra notes 191-201 and 209 and accompanying text.
178. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at *108; accord, Tremoulin v. Sands, Comb.
462, 90 Eng. Rep. 592 (K.B. 1697); Radley v. Egglesfield, 2 Wms. Saund. 259, 85 Eng.
Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1681).
179. McDonough v. Dannery (The Mary Ford), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 197 (1796)
(argument for defendant in error); see infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text.
PENDENT AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
immigrant lawyers from England.8 0 From this time, the rules of pleading
and practice in the central courts at Westminster began to appear in the
colonies, displacing the rough practices of the original American courts.'
At the same time, the monarchy began to assert more control over colonial
courts. 1 2 The-King controlled the establishment of new colonial courts,8 3
and the supreme appellate court for the colonies was the Privy Council.
1 4
Although the English judicial system was not transplanted to the
colonies, it influenced colonial jurisprudence.8 5 Important to the current
inquiry, by the eighteenth century, either through choice or imposition by
the monarchy, most of the colonies imitated the English practice of
dividing judicial business among several courts. They had common law
courts,'8 6 courts of equity,'87 and admiralty courts. 188 Exactly how these
courts dealt with cases that would not fit into neat jurisdictional packages
is unclear, as almost no decisions were reported.8 9 However, one historian
has found in the colonial courts of that time a "well-nigh utter dependence
upon English case law."'
90
One of the earliest indications of how the American courts resolved
the problems caused by separate jurisdictions is found in a 1785 case in
180. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 6. The original colonists had not established a court
system in the image of the English system. The ordinary Englishman did not have first-
hand experience with the courts at Westminster, but with the inferior local courts. See supra
note 84. Thus, it was with a "heterogeneous body of local law from the backwaters of the
mainstream of the common law that the bulk of the immigrants had had immediate
experience." J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 5. It was from this experience that the early
colonists shaped their judicial systems. Id.; see generally D. KoNIG, LAw AND SOCIETY IN
PURITAN MASSACHtUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692 (1979); L. LEWIs, THE CONSTITUTION,
JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1881); P. REiNsCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES (1899).
181. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
III (1971); J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 6-8; L. LEwis, supra note 180, at 50; P. REINSCH,
supra note 180, at 54, 58.
182. "[A]ctive intervention by the Crown began in the latter years of Charles II's reign
[1660-1685] ... ." J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 10.
183. See id. at 11-15; see also Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John
Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 922 (1978).
184. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 7; see generally id. at 35-49.
185. For an extensive discussion of early colonial court systems and their English
antecedents, see id. at 1-49. See also R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 5-7.
186. See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 9-18.
187. R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 5. Maryland, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina,
and South Carolina had separate Chancery courts. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 8 n.14.
Although the New England colonies initially had no equity courts, one was imposed on
them when they were reorganized as the Dominion of New England in the late seventeenth
century. Id. at 13 n.26.
188. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (Story, Cir.
J.); R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 5; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-4, at 10-
11; see generally 1 E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY §§ 654-665 (G. McCloskey 5th
ed. 1925).
189. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 6.
190. Id.
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the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty. 19' In Dean v. Angus 92 the court
accepted the doctrine without question. The suit was a libel, 9 for indem-
nity. The obligation for which the libellants sought indemnity arose out
of an earlier libel. In the first action, the owners of a ship captured at
sea filed suit against the owners of the captor ship, alleging that the
capture was wrongful. 94 The libellants in that suit won. The owners of
the captor ship then filed the libel in Dean against the captain of their
ship for indemnity.
The captain challenged the jurisdiction of the court, claiming that his
contract with the libellants was made on land. Moreover, the judgment
for which the libellants sought indemnity had been issued on land. 95
Therefore, he argued, the matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
a common law court. 96 The court began its opinion by noting the "ac-
knowledged" principle of law that:
Where the original cause of action is exclusively of admiralty or
exclusively of common law jurisdiction, all incidental matters, and
all matters necessarily flowing from, or dependent upon, that first
cause of action, shall follow the original jurisdiction, whatever the
complexion of those matters, separately considered, may be. 97
The court went on to hold that the second libel for indemnity was incidental
to the original libel. The admiralty court could, therefore, hear the case. l' s
The court's statement of the law was almost identical to Blackstone's
formulation of admiralty's power to address questions of common law. 99
This acceptance of Blackstone, or at least of his principles, is interesting
because it occurred after the American Revolution when there was a great
191. Pennsylvania passed an act establishing a court of admiralty on Sept. 9, 1778. 1
E. BENEDICT, supra note 188, § 667, at 821. For a discussion of post-revolutionary state
admiralty practice, see id. §§ 666-672.
192. 7 F. Cas. 294 (Pa. Adm. 1785) (No. 3702).
193. Until 1966, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became applicable to suits
in admiralty, FED. R. Cry. P. 1 advisory committee note (1966), a libel was the admiralty
equivalent of a complaint. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-12, at 35; accord,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 824.
194. When a vessel of one nation captures an enemy's vessel, the captor may file a
libel for adjudication as prize of war. "The prize proceeding, long in substantial disuse with
us, consists in the subjection to condemnation and sale of vessels and cargoes having some
'enemy' taint in wartime." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-15, at 44; accord,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1080. Of course, the owners of the captured
vessel may contend that the capture was wrongful, and if successful, may obtain damages.
See Juando v. Taylor, 13 F. Cas. 1179, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 7558); 1 E. BENEDICT,
supra note 188, § 598.
195. 7 F. Cas. at 294.
196. For a discussion of admiralty jurisdiction, see supra notes 172-78 and accompanying
text.
197. 7 F. Cas. at 294.
198. Id. at 296-97.
199. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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deal of opposition to English law. To the newly-independent Americans,
"to have been subject in any case to the law of the enemy, seemed in
some manner like a dereliction of the principle of independence .... -200
Feeling ran so high that Pennsylvania had actually "prohibited by law the
citing of British authorities posterior to the revolution.'
20 1
In 1789, as the first Congress was drafting the blueprint for the federal
judicial system, some natural antipathy toward Britain remained. 20 2 Thus,
not surprisingly, the Judiciary Act of 1789203 drew more from the practices
of the States than from those of England. Hence, the Judiciary Act is
"rooted in the law and custom of divers American jurisdictions. " 204 But
the basic model for the American federal courts provided in the Judiciary
Act did not reject the English model in one important regard. The federal
courts exercised separate jurisdiction over cases at law, in equity, and in
admiralty. 20
5
200. P. Du PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (Philadelphia 1824) (emphasis in original); accord,
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (1977).
201. P. Du PONCEAU, supra note 200, at xxiii; G. GILMORE, supra note 200, at 22-23.
202. The spirit of the Revolution had not been forgotten. Radical Republicans felt that
Americans had accepted too much of the English common law tradition. R. ELLIS, supra
note 181, at 14; J. ZAINALDIN, LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY: LEGAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
EXPANSION 8-11, 53-55 (1983). For a more detailed study of radical Republicanism and its
effects on early American jurisprudence, see R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 111-284. An
example of this attitude is Judge John Dudley's charge to the jury (circa 1805):
[T]he lawyers, the rascals!... They want to govern us by the common law of
England; trust me for it, common sense is a much safer guide for us .... It's
our business to do justice between the parties; not by any quirks o' the law out
of Coke or Blackstone-books that I never read and never will-but by common
sense and common honesty between man and man.
40 AM. L. REv. 437 (1906), reprinted in J. ZAINALDIN, supra, at 83.
203. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
204. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 458; accord, R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 112. This
is not to say that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was a complete break from English practice.
Most American procedure bore more resemblance to English law than to, say, French law.
The American practices had been after all derived or adapted from English practices to a
large degree. That is what led one scholar to comment that "English law was the only law
that post-Revolutionary American lawyers knew anything about." G. GILMORE, supra note
200, at 19. For an in-depth discussion of the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
their sources, see J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 457-508.
205. The district courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
"[Tihe forms and modes of proceedings in causes.., of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
shall be according to the course of civil law." Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93,
93-94. In 1792, Congress made it clear that these procedures were to be those of courts of
admiralty "as contradistinguished from courts of common law." Process Act of 1792, ch.
36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276; see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 173, § 1-9, at 19.
The circuit courts had jurisdiction, concurrent with the state courts, over certain suits
at common law or in equity. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. Although
§ 11 provided for jurisdiction over cases at law and in equity in the same courts, it is clear
from other sections of the Judiciary Act, the Process Acts, and early case law that the two
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This division led to the same problems encountered in England. 20 6
Because there was no division of the common law business between
separate courts, the Americans avoided one dimension of the English
problems. But what should happen to a case that is both equitable and
legal in nature? Or a case that has issues of admiralty and law? Despite
the initial rejection of English practice, 20 7 the early federal cases dealing
systems were not merged, but were to be treated separately, as in England. Suits in equity
could only be maintained if there were no adequate remedy at law. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82.
The rules of decision in trials at common law were to be the laws of the States, id. § 34,
1 Stat. at 92, and the process used in such cases was to be the process then in use in the
state courts, Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94; Process Act of 1792, ch.
36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. The process in suits in equity, however, was according to "the
course of the civil law." Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94. As with
admiralty, Congress provided in 1792 that this process was that of courts of equity "as
contradistinguished from courts of common law." Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat.
275, 276. Case law also recognized the distinction between a court of equity and a court of
common law. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hobart, 10 F. Cas. 795, 797 (C.C.D. Me. 1836) (No.
5609); Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764); see also R.
HUGHES, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS § 136, at 353 (1904).
206. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. It did not take long, however, for
American courts and lawyers to turn to English precedent for guidance. "Blackstone's
commentaries were extraordinarily influential ... in America in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries." J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 202, at 7 n.3. As early as August 8,
1792, the Supreme Court ordered that it would consider "the practice of the courts of
King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this
court . . . ." Sup. Ct. R. 8, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 414, reprinted at 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvii.
Not everyone shared this respect for English customs, however. Significant opposition
to the Mother Country remained. But the attitude of those like Judge Dudley, see supra
note 202, did not insinuate itself into the Supreme Court in its early years. The Court was
made up completely of Federalists until 1804, R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 14, and maintained
a Federalist majority until 1810, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. B at B-1 to
B-2 (11th ed. 1985). Moreover, "[n]ot one of the judges that Jefferson appointed to the
Supreme Court did anything to weaken the independence or influence of the national
judiciary or to espouse a radical brand of Jeffersonianism." R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at
241; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1834, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 646, 647 & n.13 (1982).
The doctrine does not seem to have been a matter of dispute between the Republicans
and Federalists, however. Among the topics that, "during the last two decades of the
eighteenth century provoked some of the most vituperative conflict in American political
history," Nelson, supra note 183, at 925, was "the distribution of power among various
levels of government," id. at 924. The Federalists tried to make the federal judiciary
stronger, while the Republicans were concerned over increases in federal jurisdiction. See
R. ELLIS, supra note 181, at 14-16. In 1801, "political considerations, coupled with the first
change of government under the Constitution, pushed the judiciary issue into the fore-
front . . . ." Id. at 4-5. Perhaps the most obvious example of the clash between the
Republicans and the Federalists over federal jurisdiction is the short-lived act of 1801. In
that year, the defeated Federalists passed an act that provided, inter alia, for general federal
question jurisdiction. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 11-14, 2 Stat. 89. This act was highly
controversial, and was repealed by the Republicans only a year later. Act of Mar. 8, 1802,
ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. For an in-depth look at the Judiciary Act of 1801, see Surrency, The
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with these questions followed the English solution. By 1831 the Supreme
Court was able to say, "It is ... well settled, that if the [equity]
jurisdiction attaches, the court will go on to do complete justice, although,
in its progress, it may decree on a matter which was cognizable at law.
'20 8
The same rule was followed in admiralty.
20 9
2. An English Doctrine Is Used To Solve an American Problem
The American federal system added a new dimension to the question
of when a court could rule on issues outside its jurisdiction. 210 The tripartite
division was not the only limitation on the federal courts. The judicial
power of United States courts was also limited by article III of the
Constitution2 ' and the jurisdictional statutes enacted pursuant to it. What
would happen if a nonfederal question arose in a federal case? The United
Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 53 (1958).
Thus one might expect, when the Federalist influence on the Supreme Court finally
began to wane about 1830, Currie, supra, at 648, that there would be a change in the
attitude toward the doctrine, which seems to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Yet, there was no change in attitude. In fact, Justice Johnson, the first Republican justice,
expressed surprise that anyone would question the doctrine. See infra notes 239, 419-20 and
accompanying text.
208. Cathcart v. Robertson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264, 278 (1831); accord, Russell v. Clarke's
Executors, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69, 90 (1812); see Hepburn v. Dunlop, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
179, 197 (1816); see also Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 158 (1810); Leland v.
The Ship Medora, 15 F. Cas. 298, 305 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 8237). In ruling on the
contours of the equity jurisdiction of a circuit court, Justice Story stated that this jurisdiction
"is the same in its nature and extent, as the equity jurisdiction of England, from which
ours is derived, and is governed by the same principles." Gordon v. Hobart, 10 F. Cas.
795, 797 (C.C.D. Me. 1836) (No. 5609) (Story, Cir. J.).
209. Leland v. The Ship Medora, 15 F. Cas. 298, 305 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 8237);
The Tilton, 23 F. Cas. 1277, 1279 (C.C.D. Mass. 1830) (No. 14,054); Brevoor v. The Fair
American, 4 F. Cas. 71, 73 (D. Pa. 1800) (No. 1847); Coulter v. L'Esperanza, 6 F. Cas.
641, 641 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 3277).
210. See supra note 19.
211. Article III provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CoN s. art. III, §§ 1-2.
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States courts solved this problem early in their history. They simply
adapted the old solution to the new problem. "[W]here a court has
jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the
cause .... "212 While the context in which the doctrine was applied had
changed, the basic notion of a court's power had not.
The Supreme Court first approved and exercised this new version of
the doctrine in 1796213 in the case The Mary Ford.214 In that case, the
captain and crew of an American ship, the George, found the ship Mary
Ford "utterly deserted" and in "a most perilous state. ' 21 5 The Americans
took possession of the ship and brought her into the port of Boston. The
owner and crew of the George then filed a libel for salvage216 of the Mary
Ford in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts .217
The next day, the British consul filed a claim in the district court. He
alleged that at the time the Americans took possession of the Mary Ford,
the ship was owned by subjects of the British Crown. The consul prayed
that, after a reasonable salvage was paid to the rescuers, the ship (or the
proceeds of its sale) be delivered to him.
218
A month later, the French consul filed a claim in the district court.
He admitted that the Mary Ford had been owned originally by subjects
of the British King. He asserted, however, that it had been "attacked,
subdued and taken ' 21 9 on the high seas by a squadron of ships belonging
to the French Republic. The French squadron possessed the Mary Ford
for twenty-four hours. They abandoned it, however, to prevent a weak-
ening of their force. At the time of the capture, France was at war with
Great Britain. Therefore, the consul alleged, under the law of nations, the
Mary Ford was the property of the French Republic. 220 He prayed that,
after a reasonable salvage was paid to the rescuers, the ship (or the
proceeds of its sale) be delivered to him.
221
212. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 457 (1861) (quoting Peck v. Jenniss,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624 (1849) (quoting without citation Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 328, 340 (1828))).
213. The doctrine was argued in the Supreme Court on at least one prior occasion.
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794) (argument for appellants). The Court,
however, decided that there was original jurisdiction over the claim in question. Thus, it
was unnecessary to exercise jurisdiction over a claim outside the court's power. See id. at
16 (per curiam).
214. McDonough v. Dannery (The Mary Ford), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188 (1796).
215. Id. at 188 (statement of case).
216. "A salvage award, or reward, is the compensation allowed to the volunteer whose
services on navigable waters have aided distressed property in whole or in part." M. NoRRis,
THE LAW OF SALVAOE § 3, at 3 (1958); accord, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13,
at 1202.
217. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 188 (statement of case).
218. Id. at 188-89 (statement of case).
219. Id. at 189 (statement of case).
220. See supra note 194.
221. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 189 (statement of case).
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The district judge decided first that one-third of the value of the Mary
Ford should be paid to the owner and crew of the George for salvage.
222
The judge then ruled that the remaining two-thirds of the value of the
ship should be given to the original British owners. 223 The French consul
appealed the decree only as it respected the British owners. The circuit
court reversed. 22A
The British consul appealed to the Supreme Court. 225 Here, the parties
argued not only the merits of the case, but also the jurisdiction of a
United States court to hear the dispute between them. The British consul
argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute
between him and the French consul. He cited the rule that a neutral nation
cannot determine the validity of a capture between belligerent powers.
226
The French consul responded that, even if the court did not have
jurisdiction over their dispute as an original matter, 2 7 the doctrine applied,
and the court could decide the question. It was undisputed that the federal
222. Id. at 191 (Lowel, J., district court opinion).
223. The district judge ruled in favor of the British owners because he had some doubt
as to whether the French had firm enough possession of the ship to have captured her. Id.
at 193 (Lowel, J., district court opinion).
224. The circuit court held that the French squadron had captured the ship. The French
Republic therefore had the right to the two-thirds residue. Id. at 194 (Cushing, J., circuit
court decree).
225. The appeal was actually disallowed. The case got into the Supreme Court by a
writ of error. Id. (statement of case); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73,
84-85.
226. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 195 (argument for plaintiff in error) (citing R. LEE, A TREATISE
OF CAPTUREs iN WVa 77 (London 1759)).
227. This argument was actually the French consul's second argument. He argued first
that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the French and
British consuls. He recognized the general principle that "the court of the captor [i.e., the
French] is the proper court to decide the question of prize, or no prize . . . ." 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 196 (argument for defendant in error) (citing 1 MAGENS 487, 490, 496, 505). But
he noted that there are several exceptions to that rule. A United States court does have
jurisdiction to decide the question "where neutral property of another nation, or of
[American] citizens, has been captured at sea, and is brought within [United States] ports."
Id. (argument for defendant in error) (citing Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6
(1794)). The consul reasoned that the converse must also be true. "[I]f the sovereign will
protect his citizen from injury, he must also compel him to do justice." Id. (argument for
defendant in error). In other words, the consul characterized the dispute as one between the
French Republic and the Americans, over which the court should have jurisdiction.
There is a subtle irony in the French consul's citation to The Betsey. In that case, a
French privateer captured The Betsey, which was owned by Swedes and Americans. The
owners filed a libel for restitution in a U.S. district court. They alleged the capture was
wrongful, since neither Sweden nor the United States was at war with France. The French
consul responded by claiming the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Rather, he
urged, his own prize court was the proper forum. The Supreme Court decreed, first, that the
district court could determine whether the French consul had to make restitution. Second, the
Court decreed that the French consuls could no longer operate their prize courts within the
United States. For an interesting discussion of the case, see J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 760-
65.
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court had jurisdiction over the original libel for salvage. 22 "Then, wherever
a court takes cognisance of any original matter, it naturally draws to its
jurisdiction, every incidental or necessary, question.' '229
The Supreme Court agreed with the French consul's argument. A
United States court would not have jurisdiction over the dispute between
the English and French consuls as an original matter. 230 The Court held,
however, that "the district court had jurisdiction upon the subject of
salvage; and that, consequently, they must have a power of determining,
to whom the residue of the property ought to be delivered.' '231 The Court
went on to rule on the merits of the claim between the English and French
consuls. The Court held that the French Republic had the right to receive
the residue of the property.
23 2
This case was different from the cases that held that an admiralty
court could decide questions of common law that arose in an admiralty
case. The disputed question in The Mary Ford, one of prize, was clearly
within the admiralty jurisdiction.233 Nevertheless, the federal admiralty
jurisdiction provided in article III of the United States Constitution 3 4 is
defined by the law of nations.23 Thus, the district courts do not have
228. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77; M. NoaRIs, supra note
216, § 14, at 18; see also Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 264 (1804).
229. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 197 (argument for defendant in error) (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES* 106-08).
230. The Court did not state this rule explicitly in its opinion. The Court had, however,
accepted the proposition in an earlier case. See United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
121, 129-30 (1795); see also The Brig Alerta v. Moran, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 359, 364 (1815);
Hopner v. Appleby, 12 F. Cas. 522, 523 (C.C.D.R.I. 1828) (No. 6699); Juando v. Taylor,
13 F. Cas. 1179, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 7558).
231. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 198 (per curiam). In L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 238
(1816), the Supreme Court opined that the Court in The Mary Ford had not really decided
the question of prize, but merely the question of possession. Id. at 258-59.
In the later case, American captors filed a libel in a U.S. district court to condemn
their prize, the French ship L'Invincible. The owners of an American ship, the Mount Hope,
interposed a claim asking the district court to decide the question whether the capture of
their ship was wrongful. They alleged that this claim was incidental to the condemnation
of L'Invincible. The two claims were somewhat related because the Mount Hope had been
allegedly captured by L'Invincible before her own capture. Id. at 238-39 (statement of case).
Normally, the proper court to decide the question of the capture of the Mount Hope
was in France. See supra notes 226-27 & 230 and accompanying text. However, her owners
cited The Mary Ford for the proposition that the American court with jurisdiction over the
condemnation of L'Invincible could decide the validity of the French capture incidentally.
Instead of finding that the Mount Hope proceeding was not part of the case concerning
L'Invincible, the Court chose to limit The Mary Ford. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 258-59.
232. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 198 (per curiam).
233. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 598 (1858) (quoting 3 J. STORY,
COMMENTAMES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 865 (1st ed. 1833 & photo. reprint 1987) [quotation
is actually from a later, unidentified edition of COMEaNTARIES]) (admiralty has exclusive
jurisdiction of prize cases); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 419 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.
3776) (Story, Cir. J.) (admiralty had cognizance of all questions of prize).
234. Section 2, cl. 3. The text of this clause is reprinted at supra note 211.
235. By granting the admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, "our intercourse with
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jurisdiction over cases that would not have been allowed to them by the
traditional admiralty law. 236 Therefore, since the prize in dispute in The
Mary Ford was not within the jurisdiction of a United States court under
the law of nations,237 the United States district courts could not hear it
under article III. Hence, for the first time, the Supreme Court allowed a
federal court to decide a nonfederal claim that arose in an otherwise
federal case.
In the quarter century following the Court's somewhat cryptic opinion
in The Mary Ford, a few opinions applying the doctrine in the new federal
context were reported. 238 Unfortunately for modern scholars, these opinions
were terse. There was virtually no discussion of the authority or rationale
for the doctrine. We can infer, however, that the power to address
nonfederal issues in a federal case was well-accepted from Justice John-
son's comment about this power in 1824. He remarked that "[n]o one
can question" this power.2 39
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
was asked to use the doctrine to address nonfederal questions several more
times. By this time, the Court's opinions contained a fuller explanation
of its reasoning. In these cases, the Court generally relied on English
precedent. The English courts had solved their jurisdictional woes in a
very sensible way.240 The Supreme Court reviewed the English solution
and found that "[t]his rule is the fruit of experience and wisdom, and
regulates the relations and maintains harmony among the various superior
courts of law and of chancery in Great Britain." 24 Moreover, the Court
found that the doctrine "has recommended itself to the courts as just and
other nations was to be so regulated as to make us one of the family of nations,
acknowledging the laws and respecting and adopting the usages which constitute the rule of
international intercourse . . . ." I E. BENEDICT, supra note 188, § 9, at 10; see also id. §§
5, 8, 10; Beeks & Moss, The Exclusive Admiralty Jurisdiction, 27 WAsH. L. Rv. 176, 176-
77 (1952).
236. This statement is somewhat simplistic. The courts were not completely bound by
international admiralty law. Beeks & Moss, supra note 235, at 177. The federal courts,
however, chose to be governed by the law of nations as to their jurisdiction over prize
cases. See supra notes 230 & 233 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 226-27 and
accompanying text (law of nations re prize jurisdiction).
237. See supra notes 226-27 & 230 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Renner & Bussard v. Marshal, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 215 (1816); Logan v.
Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288 (1809); Penn v. Klyne, 19 F. Cas. 166 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817)
(No. 10,936). More federal opinions discussing the doctrine in these early decades applied
it to legal issues in equitable or admiralty cases. See, e.g., Russell v. Clarke's Executors,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69, 90 (1812); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 158 (1810);
Brevoor v. The Fair American, 4 F. Cas. 71, 73 (D. Pa. 1800) (No. 1847); Coulter v.
L'Esperanza, 6 F. Cas. 641, 641 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 3277).
239. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251, 293 (1824) (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
240. See supra notes 112-32, 144-71 & 178 and accompanying text.
241. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 595 (1858).
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equal, and as opposing no hindrance to an efficient administration of the
judicial power. "242 The Court, therefore, adopted it.32
The reaction of twentieth-century jurists to the early American reliance
on English precedent is one of wonderment. The context was completely
different, modern lawyers say. In England, it was just a matter of several
courts set up by one sovereign (the King). Whether one court or another
heard and decided a particular issue was no affront to the sovereign. 2" In
America, however, a federal court hearing nonfederal issues would be
taking issues from the courts of another sovereign, the State. How could
the federal courts adapt the English practice while exhibiting the delicacy
required in this new context?
The answer to this query may be troubling to modern lawyers. In the
early years of the Republic, however, the Supreme Court's opinions did
not evidence any real sensitivity to the change in context. Early federal
courts accepted the doctrine without questioning the authority for it.245 If
they looked for anything at all to help them shape the doctrine, they
looked to English practice.
2A6
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court's opinions
began to change. They now expressed a realization that the doctrine was
altered by the change in context. There was a difference, the Court
recognized, between a federal equity court's application of the doctrine to
legal questions and its application of the doctrine to nonfederal questions.
One of the earliest hints of this awareness is seen in a dissent by Chief
Justice Taney in 1858.247 In that opinion, Taney maintained that the
majority had come to the wrong result because they treated the question
for decision as "a conflict between the jurisdiction and rights of a state
court, and the jurisdiction and rights of a court of the United States, as
a conflict between sovereignties, both acting by their officers within the
spheres of their acknowledged powers." 248 Instead, Taney asserted, the
question concerned the proper role of a common law court when faced
with an admiralty question. Thus, he implied, the rule could change with
a change in context.
249
242. Id.
243. Id.; accord, Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 345 (1866); Peck v. Jenness,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1848); Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136, 151 (1839);
see also McDonough v. Dannery (The Mary Ford), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 197-198 (1796)
(winning counsel cited Blackstone); United States v. Myers, 27 F. Cas. 38, 40 (C.C.D. Va.
1836) (Daniel, Dist. J.) (doctrine "sanctioned by the inveterate practice of courts of equity").
244. This belief ignores the very real interest the English courts had in protecting their
own sovereignty. Perhaps the best-known example of this concern is the dispute between
Sir Edward Coke and Lord Ellesmere. See supra note 164.
245. The one anomolous exception to this statement was the Supreme Court's opinion
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See infra notes
368-429 and accompanying text.
246. See cases cited in supra notes 241 & 243.
247. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1858).
248. Id. at 601 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
249. Id.
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Just a few years later, in 1865, the Supreme Court expressly recognized
that the context in which a court applied the doctrine could change the
rules of the doctrine. In Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co.,250 the Court
noted that the question was not:
whether the proceeding is supplemental and ancillary or is inde-
pendent and original, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading;
but whether it is supplemental and ancillary or is to be considered
entirely new and original, in the sense which this court has sanc-
tioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts from that of the state courts.
25
1
The Court may simply have been expressing what it had known all
along. Or maybe the Court was just beginning, as it saw more cases in
which the doctrine was applied, to realize the differences between the old
English problems and the new American ones. Whatever the case, counsel
in the Minnesota Co. case were caught off guard, not knowing how to
argue for (and against) application of the doctrine in the "new" context.
The Court chastised them as follows: "We think that all the exhaustive
research brought to bear on this technical question of equity pleading,
while creditable to the counsel on both sides, is useless in the present
case.'252
This recognition that the rules of the doctrine could change depending
on the context did not indicate a growing sensitivity to the federalism
concerns of the modern lawyer. Rather, while the Court noted that the
form of the doctrine could change, it maintained that the underlying
theory remained the same. As the Court stated in 1858: "the question has
come before this and other courts in other forms and has received its
solution by the application of a comprehensive principle ....
In fact, use of the doctrine in the new federal-nonfederal context was
actually broader than traditional applications. Each bill in equity began a
new suit. Under certain circumstances, however, two bills in equity might
be seen as part of the same case. 2 4 For example, a cross-bill by a defendant
was often treated as part of the same case as an original bill.2 55 Because
the court could answer all the questions in a case, the plaintiff on the
second bill did not have to plead independent grounds of equity jurisdic-
tion. 256 Since the federal courts of equity and law were separate and
250. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609 (1865).
251. Id. at 633.
252. Milwaukee & Minn. R.R. v. Soutter, 17 L. Ed. 886, 895 (1865). The quoted
language is deleted from the official report of the case. Cf. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co.,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 633 (1865) (official report of quoted case).
253. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 594 (1858).
254. For a definition of the terms "suit" and "case" as used in this article, see supra
note 69.
255. J. STORY, supra note 157, § 399.
256. Id. "A defendant who is brought into a court of equity may, by a cross-bill,
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distinct courts, however, the issues in a law suit were not seen as part of
the same case as the issues in a related equity suit.257 Thus the equity
plaintiff had to satisfy the court it had equity jurisdiction.
258
In the new American context of the doctrine, however, the notion of
the equitable and legal courts as two different courts faded. Rather, they
were seen as one federal court. As the Supreme Court remarked "with
reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
from that of the state courts" :259
No one, for instance, would hesitate to say that, according to the
English chancery practice, a bill to enjoin a judgment at law, is
an original bill in the chancery sense of the word. Yet this court
has decided many times, that when a bill is filed in the [Federal]
Circuit Court, to enjoin a judgment of that court, it is not to be
considered as an original bill, but as a continuation of the pro-
ceeding at law .... 260
In other words, an equitable bill could be part of the same federal case
as a law suit. Because the federal court could decide all questions in a
case properly before it, the plaintiff in the related bill did not have to
establish independent grounds of federal jurisdiction. Thus, the notion of
"case" in the new context was broader than the traditional notions.
B. The Scope of the American Doctrine: What is a "Case"?
1. In General
The statement of the doctrine is simple: "Where a court has jurisdic-
tion, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the
cause .... ',261 If one matter were properly before a court, that court
obtain a money recovery on a purely legal demand if it is germane to the cause of suit
alleged in the bill." H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, at 122 (footnote omitted). But see J.
STORY, supra note 157, § 358 (relief prayed by cross-bill should be equitable relief).
257. There were a few exceptions to this rule. For example, a bill for discovery in aid
of an action at law was considered ancillary to the law suit. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note
146, § 206. The plaintiff to such bill still had to establish that the court of equity had
jurisdiction over the bill. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
258. Of course, "[wihen equity jurisdiction has once attached to a suit, the court may
retain jurisdiction to give complete relief ... even though such ... relief could be obtained
at law." H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, at 121 (emphasis added); see supra notes 144-71
& 208 and accompanying text.
259. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 633 (1865).
260. Id.
261. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 599-600 (1840). (Baldwin, J., concurring)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). This is the basic principle that underlies all cases
in which the doctrine is applied, whether they be denominated "ancillary" or "pendent"
jurisdiction cases by modern scholars. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213
U.S. 175, 191 (1909) ("Federal questions ... gave the Circuit Court jurisdiction, and,
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could rule on any other matter in the "cause" or "case." 26 2 That simple
statement of the doctrine, however, does not help the twentieth-century
lawyer understand the scope of the American version of the doctrine.
What was a "case" so that we may understand what questions would be
considered to have "occurred in the case"?
The language in the early opinions indicates that the concept "case"
is very broad. A case includes the plaintiff's claims as well as the defen-
dant's defenses and claims. 26 3 It includes all stages necessary to adjudicate
the dispute between the parties, even subsequent suits to enforce or enjoin
the judgment in the first suit. 264 One scholar opined, based on this broad
view, that a case is anything the procedural rules say it is.265
This theory, however, confuses the notion of a "case," to which a
court's jurisdiction extends, with the litigative unit as defined by the
procedural rules, referred to in this article as a "suit. ' 266 While the size
of the permissible litigative unit influenced the definition of a "case,''267
having properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all the questions in the
case .... ") ("pendent" jurisdiction); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 457 (1861)
(" '... where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs
in the cause .......") ("ancillary" jurisdiction); Omaha Horse Ry. v. Cable Tram-Way Co.
of Omaha, 32 F. 727, 729 (C.C.D. Neb. 1887) ("when a case is presented involving a federal
question, the jurisdiction of the court attaches to the whole case, and is not limited to the
mere decision of that single federal question.") ("pendent" jurisdiction); Miller v. Rogers,
29 F. 401, 402 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1886) ("where the court has once acquired jurisdiction of
the cause, a supplementary proceeding may be maintained without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.") ("ancillary" jurisdiction).
262. "Cause imports a judicial proceeding entire, and is nearly synonymous with lis in
Latin, or suit in English. 'Case' not infrequently has a more limited signification, importing
a collection of facts, with the conclusion of law thereon. But 'cause' and 'case' are often
synonymous." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
The term "case" will be used in this article instead of "cause" for two reasons. First,
the twentieth-century reader is more apt to be familiar with it. Second, "case" avoids the
confusion engendered by the term "cause of action," which might arise if the term "cause"
were used. See supra note 58 and infra notes 477-85 and accompanying text.
In this article, the term "suit" is not used synonymously with "case." See supra note
69.
263. Cohens v. Va., 19 (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821); see also Railroad Co. v. Miss., 102
U.S. (12 Otto) 135, 141 (1880); Tenn. v. Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 264 (1880).
264. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
265. Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1, at 1479; see also Freer, supra
note 1, at 56-58.
266. See supra note 69.
267. The philosophy of equity, to do complete justice, which led to a much broader
permissible litigative unit than law, was very influential in the development of the American
notion of a "case." See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text. Moreover, when the
size of the litigative unit was expanded to include certain claims by defendants, the courts
recognized those claims for the first time as part of the original case. See infra notes 470-
76 and accompanying text. The influence of procedure on jurisdiction is still apparent today.
For example, in Gibbs the Supreme Court held that two claims are part of the same case
"if ... a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding." 383 U.S. at 725.
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the two concepts are separate. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the procedural rules allowing joinder of parties and claims in one suit
were very narrow. 26 In addition, the bifurcated system of law and equity
often caused parties to divide their cases into two or more suits. 269 As
noted above, 270 however, federal jurisdiction was not limited by the defi-
nition of a suit. Frequently, two or more suits would be viewed as part
of the same case. 271 As long as a federal court had jurisdiction over the
first suit, a federal court could address the claims in the other suits, even
without independent federal jurisdiction.
By the same token, twentieth-century procedural reforms have allowed
the joinder in one suit of completely unrelated claims. 272 While these claims
have been allowed as part of the same suit, they have never been considered
part of the same case for jurisdictional purposes. 273 Thus, we are back to
the initial question: what is a "case"? We must examine the early opinions
to determine the answer to that question.
In defining the concept "case," the early federal courts turned to the
ancient principle of equity274 that a court "should do complete justice as
between all parties before it, giving to each party the redress which ex
equo et bono belongs to him, rather than compelling him to go out into
another forum for their establishment.' '275 Thus, a defendant was allowed
to file a cross-bill, even without independent federal jurisdiction, if it
would allow the court to make "a complete determination of the matters
already in litigation. ' 276 For example, in Schenck v. Peay,277 Schenck, an
268. See generally C. CLARK, supra note 138, §§ 56-77; Matasar, "One Constitutional
Case," supra note 1, at 1484 n.387.
269. For example, a party might wish to pursue both an action at law for breach of
contract and an equitable suit for reformation of the contract. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v.
Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 37 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1889); see also Lumley v. Wabash Ry.,
76 F. 66 (6th Cir. 1896) (action at law for personal injuries; equitable suit to cancel release).
270. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
271. For a complete discussion of when two suits were deemed part of the same case,
see infra notes 276-312 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (b), 18; Fed. R. Equity 26, 30, 226 U.S. 649, 655,
657 (1912).
273. See, e.g., Gallardo v. Santini Fertilizer Co., 11 F.2d 587, 589 (1st Cir. 1926) (each
of plaintiff's unrelated claims requires independent federal jurisdiction); Cleveland Eng'g
Co. v. Galion Dynamic Motor Truck Co., 243 F. 405, 407 (N.D. Ohio 1917) (permissive
counterclaim requires independent federal jurisdiction); see also infra notes 451-56 and
accompanying text. Even the scholar who proposed that a "case" was the same as a "suit"
was troubled by his proposition. He suggested that the tenth amendment, for example,
imposed additional limitations on a federal court's jurisdiction. See Matasar, "One Consti-
tutional Case, " supra note 1, at 1487-89.
274. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
275. Howards v. Selden, 5 F. 465, 474 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1880) (citing inter alia J. STORY,
EQUITY PLEADINGS).
276. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co. v. Tex. Central Ry., 137 U.S. 171, 201
(1890); accord, Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 F. 166, 181 (C.C.D. Mont.
1906); Howards v. Selden, 5 F. 465, 474 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1880); Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas.
667, 669 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1868) (No. 12,450).
277. 21 F. Cas. 667 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1868) (No. 12,450).
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Ohio citizen, filed a bill in federal court against Peay and Bliss, both
citizens of Arkansas. Schenck sought to quiet title to certain real estate
as against Peay and a partition of it as against Bliss. Peay maintained
that the titles of Schenck and Bliss were void, and filed a cross-bill against
them to quiet title. Because Peay and Bliss were from the same State,
complete diversity was lacking on the cross-bill. The federal court looked
to the "essence of the matter, ' 278 and found that the cross-bill enabled
Peay to defend himself fully against the original bill. 279 It was "necessary
to a complete determination of the controversy brought before the court
by the original bill" 280 for the court to hear the nonfederal claim. The
defendant's claim therefore was considered to be part of the same case as
plaintiff's claim.28' No independent jurisdiction over the cross-bill was
required.
If, however, a "cross-bill ha[d] no relation to the subject matter of
[plaintiff's] suit, nor [was the] cross-bill in any sense a reply to allegations
of the original bill, ' 2 82 the federal court was much more likely to require
independent federal jurisdiction before it would allow the suit. If the
cross-bill were filed solely against co-defendants and did not affect the
relief requested by plaintiff, 2 3 a federal court might not deem it to be
part of the same case as the original suit. For example, in Putnam v. New
Albany,28 4 plaintiffs filed a diversity action against a railroad and the
subscribers to its stock. Plaintiffs had recovered a judgment against the
railroad in a previous suit and were attempting to collect it. One of the
defendants filed a cross-bill against the other defendants, seeking an
accounting among the subscribers to ascertain how much each one owed
the railroad. Because all the defendants were citizens of Indiana, there
was no independent federal jurisdiction over the cross-bill. The court
278. Id. at 669.
279. Id. Providing a party with the opportunity to defend himself or herself is often
cited as the reason that that party's nonfederal claim is part of a federal case. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Christian, 125 U.S. 642, 645 (1888); First Nat'l Bank of Salem v. Salem Capital
Flour-Mills Co., 31 F. 580, 584 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887); Stone v. Bishop, 23 F. Cas. 154, 155
(C.C.D. Mass. 1878). The court in Schenck also suggested that it was important that there
be no new parties to the nonfederal bill. 21 F. Cas. at 669. This requirement had been
suggested earlier in a Supreme Court opinion, Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 3 (1834).
However, as the Supreme Court later remarked, "This [requirement] was probably not
intended, as any party may file the bill whose interests are affected by the suit at law."
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861).
280. 21 F. Cas. at 669.
281. "[T]he cross-bill and the original bill are but one cause, and jurisdiction of the
latter includes the former." First Nat'l Bank of Salem v. Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co.,
31 F. 580, 584 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).
282. Vannerson v. Leverett, 31 F. 376, 377 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887); accord, Putnam v.
City of New Albany, 20 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.D. Ind. 1869) (No. 11,481); see Ames Realty Co.
v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 F. 166, 180 (C.C.D. Mont. 1906); see also Ayres v. Carver,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 594-95 (1854).
283. In other words, if it were like the modern cross-claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
284. 20 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.D. Ind. 1869) (No. 11,481).
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refused to consider the cross-bill part of the same case as the original suit
because plaintiffs were not interested in the results of that accounting and
because postponing final hearing on the plaintiffs' bill until the cross-bill
was decided would be unjust. 2 5 While it was not unheard of for a federal
court to deem a cross-bill between defendants part of plaintiff's case,
28 6
plaintiff's interest in the results of the cross-bill was a factor in that
decision.
287
As complete relief was the goal of the federal court, it should not be
surprising that the scope of a case could include a plaintiff's nonfederal
claim, too. For example, in Rosenbaum v. Council Bluffs Insurance Co.,288
plaintiffs filed an action at law in state court to recover on an insurance
policy. Although plaintiffs were citizens of Illinois and defendant was a
citizen of Iowa, diversity jurisdiction did not exist over their claim.
Plaintiffs were assignees of the policy, and the assignor was a citizen of
Iowa. Under the then-current jurisdictional statutes, the citizenship of the
assignor was the relevant one when determining if diversity existed. 28 9
Nevertheless, another provision of the jurisdictional statutes provided that
even in those circumstances, if defendant alleged local prejudice, the suit
could be removed to federal court.290 That was done in this instance.
Plaintiffs then sought to file a bill in federal court seeking a reformation
of the policy. Just as with the original suit, there was no original federal
jurisdiction over this bill. The court, however, allowed the bill, finding
that it was "necessary to the full and final hearing and disposition of [the
federal suit].
' 29 1
The court relied on Krippendorf v. Hyde,2 92 deemed by modern scho-
lars as a leading case on "ancillary" jurisdiction.293 Yet, the court in
285. Putnam v. New Albany, 20 F. Cas. 79, 83 (C.C.D. Ind. 1869) (No. 11,481); see
also Vannerson v. Leverett, 31 F. 376, 377 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
286. See, e.g., Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 F. 166 (C.C.D. Mont.
1906); United States v. Myers, 27 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1836) (No. 15,844).
287. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Mass. Bonding Co., 68 F.2d 445, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1934);
Ames Realty Co., 146 F. at 177. This result may have been an instance of procedure
influencing the scope of jurisdiction. A proper cross-bill "touch[ed] the matters in question
in the original bill." J. STORY, supra note 157, § 389. The Supreme Court therefore ruled
that a 'cross-bill' in which plaintiff on the original bill was not interested was not a proper
cross-bill. Ayres v. Carver, 54 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 594-95 (1854). Thus, a suit that was not
ancillary to a proper suit under the rules of equity pleading was not part of the same "case"
as the original suit, either. This view changed as the rules of procedure changed. See infra
notes 470-76 and accompanying text.
288. 37 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1889).
289. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
290. Id. § 2; see Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81 (1884); Bushnell v.
Kennedy, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 387 (1869); Green v. Custard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 484 (1859).
291. Rosenbaum v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 37 F. 724, 725 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1889).
292. 110 U.S. 276 (1884).
293. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 28 n.2. Of course, strictly speaking,
Rosenbaum was a case involving ancillary jurisdiction; Plaintiff's bill was ancillary to the
lawsuit. But modern commentators do not recognize that "ancillary" jurisdiction applies to
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Rosenbaum found absolutely no difference between Krippendorf and the
case before it.294 Once the jurisdiction of the federal court attached, the
court would go on to grant complete relief, no matter what the posture
of the parties. 2
95
The same result occurred if plaintiff's federal and nonfederal claims
were joined in the same suit. In Ober v. Gallagher,296 Fleming, a citizen
of Tennessee, had assigned a series of notes to Gallagher, a citizen of
Louisiana. When the debtor, Thompson, a citizen of Tennessee, defaulted
on one of the notes, Gallagher sued him in state court. Gallagher obtained
a judgment in that suit, but was unable to collect. He therefore filed a
diversity action in federal court to collect on the judgment. This action
was properly before the federal court.297 Gallagher amended his bill,
however, to include claims on other notes on which Thompson had
subsequently defaulted, but which were not merged in the state court
judgment. The federal court had no independent jurisdiction over these
claims because both the assignor and defendant were from the same
State. 298 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, relying on the same principles
of equity, held that the federal court could hear and determine the
nonfederal claim in order to "make its jurisdiction effectual for complete
relief." 299
The notion that a federal court would give a plaintiff complete relief
extended even if a nondiverse party was substituted for the original
plaintiff. For example, in Miller v. Rogers00 plaintiffs filed a diversity
action against Mary Ann Rogers, a citizen of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs
sought to set aside a deed of conveyance of real estate to her. While the
suit was pending, plaintiffs sold the real estate to a Pennsylvania bank
and conveyed their title to the bank. The bank then filed a bill against
Rogers, seeking the same relief as the original plaintiffs. The court held
that independent federal jurisdiction over the second bill was not needed;
Plaintiff's claims against the original Defendant. Moreover, the rule was the same even
when Plaintiff's claim against Defendant was in the same suit as the first. See infra notes
296-99 and accompanying text.
294. 37 F. at 725.
295. See also Lumley v. Wabash R.R., 76 F. 66 (6th Cir. 1896) (action at law for
personal injuries and bill to cancel release part of same case, relying on "ancillary jurisdic-
tion" opinion). The fact that Defendant sought the federal jurisdiction initially through
removal was irrelevant. The same rule applies if Plaintiff came to federal court first. See
infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
296. 93 U.S. 199 (1876).
297. The suit was based on the judgment, not on the assigned notes. The assignment
clause therefore did not apply. Oher v. Gallagher, 93 U.S. 199, 206 (1876).
298. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
299. 93 U.S. at 206; see also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191
(1909); Omaha Horse Ry. v. Cable Tram-Way Co. of Omaha, 32 F. 727, 729 (C.C.D. Neb.
1887).
300. 29 F. 401 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1886).
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it was part of the same case as the original bill, even though the new
party destroyed diversity.
30'
The doctrine that a court would grant complete relief included the
converse statement of the rule: a party could get no more relief than he
or she was entitled to. The federal courts, therefore, often allowed stran-
gers to the litigation to interject themselves into it if their rights might be
prejudiced by the court's action. Thus, in the well-known case of Freeman
v. Howe,30 2 strangers to the litigation alleged that if plaintiffs received the
relief they sought, the strangers' rights would be prejudiced. The Supreme
Court held that the strangers could file a bill in federal court to enjoin
the litigation and have their claims resolved. That the court had no
independent federal jurisdiction over the bill was immaterial. The court
had to hear the bill to prevent plaintiff from receiving an inequitable
advantage.
303
When strangers to the litigation interjected their claims into it, the
posture of the parties asserting the nonfederal claims was irrelevant. The
interjection was allowed even if the stranger joined the suit as a co-
plaintiff.3° Moreover, the plaintiff who had initially sought the federal
court's aid was still entitled to complete relief. Therefore, if plaintiff, in
order to get the relief to which he or she was entitled, had to file a claim
against the new, nondiverse party, that claim was allowed.30
There was one exception to an interested stranger's ability to thrust
himself or herself into a federal litigation. The federal court would not
act if it could not grant complete relief to the parties:
a circuit court can make no decree affecting the rights of an absent
person, and can make no decree between the parties before it,
which so far involves or depends upon the rights of an absent
person, that complete and final justice cannot be done between
the parties to the suit without affecting those rights.
30 6
301. Miller v. Rogers, 29 F. 401, 402 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1886). The court relied on Clarke
v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838). For a discussion of Clarke, see infra notes
320-23.
302. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
303. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861); see, e.g., Park v. New
York, Lake Erie & Western R.R., 70 F. 641 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895); McBee v. Marietta &
North Ga. Ry., 48 F. 243 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1891); Central Trust Co. of New York v.
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry., 46 F. 156 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891); St. Luke's Hosp. v.
Barclay, 21 F. Cas. 212 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855) (No. 12,241); see also Campbell v. Emerson,
4 F. Cas. 1162 (C.C.D. Mi. 1839) (No. 2357). The interested strangers could interject
themselves even after the federal litigation had ended, seeking relief from the effects of an
unfair judgment. See, e.g., Pacific R.R. of Mo. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 110 U.S. 505
(1884); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1
(1834); Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288 (1809); Central Trust Co. of New York v.
Bridges, 57 F. 753 (6th Cir. 1893); Thompson v. McReynolds, 29 F. 657 (W.D. Ark. 1887).
304. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
305. Reilly v. Golding, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 56 (1870).
306. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 141-42 (1854).
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Thus, for example, if plaintiff sought the rescission of a contract, but
sued less than all of the contractors, the court was faced with a dilemma.
The court simply could not rescind the contract as to a few of the parties.
Moreover, the court would not decide the rights of the absent parties,
because it could not bind them.307 Plaintiff, therefore, could not get the
relief sought, and the court would not act.30 The absent parties were free
to appear voluntarily, 30 9 but the federal court could not act if those parties
destroyed the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. 310
This problem did not exist in actions at common law, however,
because:
at common law, the plaintiff, by his judgment against one of his
joint debtors, gets the relief he is entitled to, and no injustice is
done to the debtor, because he is only made to perform an
obligation which he was legally bound to perform before.3 '
Moreover, those not made parties to the suit were not prejudiced because
they were not bound by any decree the court might make. Therefore, the
court was capable of granting the relief asked for in the suit as fashioned
and would proceed without the outsiders. If the outsiders' rights would
be prejudiced by the proceeding, they could intervene or file a bill to
enjoin the action, even if they destroyed diversity. 12
2. The Disappearing Federal Question
In determining the nature of a federal court's power to decide a
nonfederal claim, the Supreme Court had to address another question.
What would happen to the nonfederal claim if the federal claim disap-
peared, through, e.g., settlement or dismissal? The English courts often
exercized jurisdiction even after the claims within their jurisdiction had
disappeared. 313 The American courts followed the same practice. Perhaps
the best-known confirmation of this power is found in Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad.31 4 There, the Supreme Court averred that:
having properly obtained [jurisdiction], [a federal] court had the
right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided
the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even
307. Hagan v. Walker, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 29, 36 (1852).
308. Shields, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 142; see also Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 280 (1868) (court would not act in suit for partition without all owners before court).
309. Jones v. Andrews, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 327, 332 (1870).
310. Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 288 (1868); Commercial & R.R.
Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60, 65 (1840).
311. Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 288 (1868); see also Inbusch v.
Farwell, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 566, 571-73 (1862); Clearwater v. Meredith, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
489, 493 (1859); Hagan v. Walker, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 29, 36 (1852).
312. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 123-32 & 147-62 and accompanying text.
314. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local
or state questions only.
31 5
Thus, once the jurisdiction of a federal court attaches to a case, including
the nonfederal claims, it is not lost even if the federal claims later disappear
from the case.
This power was actually a simple extension of the basic doctrine, a
corollary to it. In 1824 Chief Justice Marshall confidently proclaimed: "It
is quite clear, that the jurisdiction of the [federal] court depends upon the
state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting,
it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. ' 31 6 On the one hand, this
statement was merely a reformulation of the basic doctrine. 3 7 "Subsequent
events" included the filing of a nonfederal claim. Thus, for example,
suppose a suit at law is properly pending in the federal court. Then an
outsider files a bill in equity to enjoin the action at law, asking the federal
court to decide his or her related claims. There is no independent federal
jurisdiction over this bill, however. As we have seen,318 this "subsequent
event" would not oust the federal court's jurisdiction; the court could
decide the whole case.
1 9
On the other hand, Marshall's statement led to the formulation of the
corollary. Thus, "subsequent events" included not only the filing of a
nonfederal claim, but also the disappearance of the federal claim. In
Clarke v. Mathewson,320 for example, plaintiff, a Connecticut citizen, filed
a diversity action against defendant, a Rhode Island citizen. While suit
was pending, plaintiff died. Under the rules of pleading, this claim became
abated,32' or "disappeared." To continue the action, plaintiff's adminis-
trator, a Rhode Island citizen, had to file a bill of revivor. 322 There was
no independent federal jurisdiction over this bill. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held:
The parties to the original bill were citizens of different states;
and the jurisdiction of the court completely attached to the con-
troversy. Having so attached, it could not be divested by any
subsequent events; and the court had a rightful authority to
proceed to a final determination of it.323
315. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) (emphasis added).
316. Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824).
317. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
319. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861) (citing Clarke v.
Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834)).
320. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838).
321. See J. STORY, supra note 157, §§ 329, 354.
322. See id. § 354.
323. Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164, 170 (1839) (citing Dunn v. Clarke, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824); Morgan's
Heirs v. Morgan, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 290 (1817)).
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Likewise, in United States v. Myers,a24 the court found that the
disappearance of a federal claim did not divest a federal court of juris-
diction over the nonfederal claim. In that case, the United States brought
suit to recover a debt for duty bonds. The federal court had jurisdiction
of the matter because the suit was brought by the United States. 325 The
defendants included the surety on the bonds and an agent of the orginal
debtors. The surety and the agent each claimed the right to collect debts
due to the debtors. These parties, however, were both Virginia citizens.
Thus, the federal court did not have independent jurisdiction over their
claims against each other. Some of the defendants objected to the juris-
diction of the court, asserting, inter alia, that if the United States received
satisfaction of its claim, the court would then lose jurisdiction of the
claim between the co-defendants. The court retained jurisdiction of the
matter, however, opining that "a decree between co-defendants, though
both citizens of Virginia, may be made in this court.' '1 26 The court reasoned
that once the jurisdiction of the court attached, subsequent events could
not deprive it of that jurisdiction.
327
In Omaha Horse Railway v. Cable Tram-Way Co. of Omaha,1
2
1
plaintiff asserted two claims for relief. First, plaintiff averred that the
contract awarded to defendant by the State of Nebraska impaired the
obligation of its contract with plaintiff, in violation of the United States
Constitution. 329 This federal claim was enough to confer federal question
jurisdiction on the circuit court. Plaintiff also alleged that the contract
with defendant violated plaintiff's rights under the Nebraska Constitution.
The federal court found that the federal constitution was not violated.
It then went on to hold, in the face of a jurisdictional challenge by
defendant, that the state constitution had been violated. In so ruling, the
court noted that "[i]t is the settled law of the supreme court that, when
a case is presented involving a federal question, the jurisdiction of the
court attaches to the whole case, and is not limited to the mere decision
of that single federal question."
330
Some federal courts refused to accept the corollary. 33' The Supreme
Court expressly adopted it, however, in two cases. First, in Moore v. New
324. 27 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1836) (No. 15,844).
325. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 4. The text of this clause is reprinted at supra
note 211.
326. United States v. Myers, 27 F. Cas. 38, 43 (C.C.D. Va. 1838) (No. 15,844) (Barbour,
Cir. J.) (citing Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834)).
327. Id. at 40 (Daniel, Dist. J.) (citing Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834));
accord, id. at 43 (Barbour, Cir. J.) (citing Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834)).
328. 32 F. 727 (C.C.D. Neb. 1887).
329. Art. I, § 10.
330. 32 F. at 729 (citing Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 135 (1880);
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257 (1880)).
331. See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201
U.S. 166 (1906); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch-Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901));
Cabaniss v. Reco Mining Co., 116 F. 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1902); Kromer v. Everett Imp. Co.,
110 F. 22, 25 (C.C.D. Wash. 1901).
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York Cotton Exchange,33 2 the Court held that a federal court maintained
jurisdiction over a nonfederal counterclaim even after dismissing the
plaintiff's federal claim. 3 3 Second, in Hum v. Oursler,34 the Supreme
Court held that a federal court could maintain jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
nonfederal claim after disposing of the federal claim adversely to plain-
tiff.335 In a third case, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 36 the Supreme
Court held that whether a federal court applied the corollary was within
the discretion of the trial court.
3 37
IV. THE MYTHS OF "PENDENT" AND "ANCILLARY" JURISDICTION
EXPLAINED
A. The Myths of "Ancillary" Jurisdiction
1. The Terminology
The use of the term "ancillary jurisdiction" to apply to, for example,
a defendant's counterclaim or an intervenor's claim is somewhat anach-
ronistic. The term was derived from equity pleading. 338 A bill that was
considered dependent on an original bill was called an "auxiliary" or
"ancillary" bill. Such bills, while separate from the original suit, were so
closely related to it that they were nevertheless considered part of the
same case as the original bill.3 39 As the doctrine was adapted to the needs
of the federal court system,340 the terminology was borrowed. Thus, a
separate nonfederal bill, such as a cross-bill or a bill to enjoin an action
at law, that was considered part of the federal case was referred to as an
ancillary bill.
341
It is not remarkable, therefore, that the oft-cited case of Freeman v.
Howe3 42 is referred to as a case of "ancillary jurisdiction." The strangers
to the original litigation who claimed an interest in the property seized by
the federal court were unable procedurally to intervene in the law suit.
But the settled practice of the federal courts allowed them to file a bill in
332. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
333. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 608-09 (1926). The dismissal
of the federal claim was on the merits. Had it been on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, the
federal court's jurisdiction would never have attached to it, let alone the nonfederal
counterclaim. If that had been the case, the nonfederal counterclaim would have been
dismissed with the federal claim. Id.
334. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
335. Hum v. Oursler, 298 U.S. 238, 245 (1933).
336. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
337. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966); see supra note 59.
338. See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 146, §§ 206-212.
339. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
341. An ancillary suit "grows immediately out of and is a necessity which arises from
the [original] suit .... The [ancillary] suit is really a continuation of that one." Minnesota
Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 632 (1865).
342. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
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equity to enjoin the law suit. This bill was ancillary to the law suit and
thus part of the same case. The federal court, therefore, could determine
their rights, despite the lack of diversity, in the ancillary proceeding.
3 43
By the time Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange" was decided, the
Federal Rules of Equity had been promulgated.141 One innovation in the
rules was to permit a defendant with a claim against the plaintiff to file
a counterclaim in the same suit, rather than being forced to file a separate
cross-bill.3 46 Thus, the federal court did not have to exercise jurisdiction
over a separate, ancillary proceeding. The counterclaim was part of the
same suit as plaintiff's claim. The justification for the result in Moore
may "be found in the adumbrations of ancillary or auxiliary jurisdic-
tion, ' ' 347 but the jurisdiction exercised was not ancillary jurisdiction in the
traditional sense. Thus, it should not be surprising that the Moore Court
did not refer to the jurisdiction it exercised as "ancillary jurisdiction" or
cite Freeman 348
Today, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most claims that
were traditionally filed as ancillary bills are part of the same suit as the
plaintiff's original federal claim.3 49 There is thus no need for the court to
exercise jurisdiction over an ancillary proceeding. To use the adjective
''ancillary" to describe these claims today holds on to a procedure that
has long since disappeared.
2. The Basis for the Doctrine
As we have seen,350 federal courts exercised jurisdiction over nonfederal
claims in order to provide complete relief among the parties. This practice
was derived from Chancery practice and ensured fairness to the litigants.
Yet many scholars and courts have opined that federal courts exercised
"ancillary jurisdiction" initially only when the federal court had possession
of the property of third parties. These jurists aver that the doctrine was
originally a doctrine of necessity.
35'
343. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861).
344. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
345. The Federal Rules of Equity are reprinted at 226 U.S. 649 (1912).
346. See Fed. R. Equity 30, 226 U.S. at 657.
347. Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45
YALE L.J. 393, 413 (1936).
348. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
349. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a), (b), (g), 18, 20, 24. There are a few exceptions. For
example, a suit brought to enforce a judgment would still be considered "ancillary" to the
original suit.
350. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., J. FRiEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.14, at
76, 80; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 29; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3523, at 85, 87; Freer, supra note 1, at 50; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case, "
supra note 1, at 1411; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 153; Minahan, supra note 1, at
285, 293; B.U. Note, supra note 1, at 925; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 267, 268, 270; YALE
Note, supra note 1, at 79; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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Some historical evidence could lead these theorists to this conclusion.
A desire to reduce the second evil of a divided court system-conflict
between the courts-also played a role in the development of the American
doctrine. In the early Republic, most state courts, and therefore the federal
courts sitting in them,35 2 followed the then-current English practice: 3 3 in
common law actions, defendants were arrested to command their appear-
ance. 35 4 A problem arose, as it had in England, when an officer of one
court attempted to arrest a defendant who was already in the custody of
another court.. The federal courts resolved the problem very much like the
English common law courts had. 355 In America, "[w]here persons or
property are liable to seizure or arrest by the process of both [state and
federal courts], that which first attached should have the preference. ' 356
That question also was addressed in cases involving the seizure of
property, rather than the arrest of a defendant. The New England States
still used the older English methods of process, 317 requiring the attachment
of defendant's property before arrest was permitted. 358 Problems occurred
352. The original Process Acts provided that, in a common law action, a federal court
must follow the process of the State in which it sat. Act of Aug. 1, 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat.
499; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat.
275, 276; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93. Because the state process that
was followed was that current when the State was admitted to the Union, not the practice
current at the time of suit, the federal courts often applied an out-of-date rule. To correct
this confusing situation, Congress passed the Conformity Act in 1872. Act of June 1, 1872,
ch. 255, 17 Stat. 197. From that time until the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in 1938, the federal courts followed the current procedure of the State in which
they sat in common law actions.
353. See supra notes 109, 124 & 125.
354. W. Cox, COMMON LAW PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS 82-83 (1877).
355. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
356. Exparte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 446 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259) (Grier, Cir.
J.); accord, Duncan v. Darst, 42 U.S. (I How.) 301 (1843); see Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 450, 459 (1861) (rule applies also to "arrests upon mesne, and imprisonment
upon final process of person").
357. For a brief discussion of the various forms of mesne process formerly used in
England, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
358. J. GOEBEL, supra note 83, at 511-12, 517-18; accord, Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 450, 453 (1861) (suit commenced "in the usual way" in Massachusetts, by process
of attachment); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 618 (1849) (suit commenced according
to practice of New Hampshire, by attachment). Attachment remained the usual procedure
to commence suit in New England until well into the twentieth century. C. CLARK, supra
note 138, at 75 n.6.
Today, suit is commenced in most of the New England States by service of a summons
and complaint. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1980); MASS. R. CIV. P. 3, 4; R.I.
SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 3, 4; R.I. DIST. CT. Civ. R. 3, 4; VT. R. Civ. P. 3, 4; see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-45a (West Supp. 1988) (suit may be commenced by writ of
summons). Attachment, however, remains an option for plaintiff in all the New England
States. See id.; ME. R. Civ. P. 4A; MASS. R. Civ. P. 4.1; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509:4
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-14 (1985); VT. R. Civ. P. 4.1.
Process by arrest of the defendant is still available in Maine and Rhode Island. See
ME. R. Civ. P. 4C; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-14 (1985).
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when one court attached the property of the defendant, and another court
attempted to seize the same property from the first court.359 The rule was
the same. "Neither can one [court] take property from the custody of the
other by replevin or any other process ....
The reasoning of the American courts was the same as the reasoning
behind the English notion of jurisdiction:36' any other rule "would produce
a conflict extremely embarrassing to the administration of justice" 362 and
"lead to most deplorable consequences. ' 363 In fact, the Supreme Court
consciously looked to English practice. The Court noted: "This rule is the
fruit of experience and wisdom, and regulates the relations and maintains
harmony among the various superior courts of law and of chancery in
Great Britain.
364
That a state court could not attach the property in the custody of the
federal court posed no problem for the state court claimants. The federal
courts recognized that the rule protecting their sovereignty might lead to
unfairness for the claimants. The doctrine, however, mitigated this un-
fairness. Someone with a claim to property in the custody of a federal
court could file a bill to enjoin the proceeding until his or her claim was
adjudicated. Because this party's claim in essence alleged that the federal
plaintiff might receive more relief than he or she was entitled to, this
claim was considered part of the federal case. Independent federal juris-
diction over the bill was unnecessary.
365
359. The problem arose in other situations as well. For example, officers of different
courts might attempt to seize the same property to execute on different judgments. See,
e.g., Pulliam v. Osborne, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 471 (1854); Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
400 (1836). In addition, an officer of one court might attempt to seize the assets of a trust
or estate that was in the custody or control of another court. See, e.g., Peale v. Phipps,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 368 (1852); Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 52 (1852); Williams
v. Benedict, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 107 (1850).
360. Peck v. Jenniss, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624 (1849); cf. supra note 114 and
accompanying text (English common law rule re conflicting attempts to seize property);
supra note 168 and accompanying text (Chancery rule re attempt to seize property from its
custody).
361. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
362. Peck v. Jenniss, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624 (1849); accord, Freeman v. Howe, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 450, 455 (1861) (rule to avoid "unseemly collision between" courts).
363. Exparte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 446 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259) (Grier, Cir.
J.).
364. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 594 (1858); see also Buck v. Colbath,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 344-45 (1866); see supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
365. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861). Whether nonfederal
claimants could proceed in federal court against a party in the custody of that court was
not addressed. In Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136 (1839), the Supreme Court
held that the court in which action was commenced first retained jurisdiction over the whole
case. The first court, the federal court, had commenced suit through capias, while the
second court, a state court, had attached defendant's property. The first court retained the
case, suggesting that nonfederal claimants could proceed in federal court against the "seized"
party. But in Duncan v. Darst, 42 U.S. (I How.) 301 (1843), the Supreme Court, in dicta,
suggested that they could not. Id. at 307. However, the Court may have been referring to
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Thus, federal courts did exercise jurisdiction over nonfederal claims
to property in their possession. That is not to say, however, that the
federal courts could hear a nonfederal ancillary bill only when they had
property in their possession. In numerous instances federal courts applied
the doctrine even though they did not have control of certain property.
366
Just as in Chancery, 367 the federal courts endeavored to reduce the burdens
on litigants caused by the divided court system, even when sovereignty
concerns were not involved. It is therefore more accurate to describe the
doctrine as one of fairness, not necessity.
B. The Puzzle of Osborn
Despite the evidence of the doctrine's age, why do modern scholars
believe that Osborn v. Bank of United States368 was the first case to
approve the doctrine? 369 The answer is simple: because Chief Justice
Marshall discussed it at length in that case as if it were a question of first
impression. 370 Marshall, however, often treated settled questions as if they
had not been decided before. 371 One cannot help asking why he did it in
this case. His motives are unclear. They may be explained by the historical
context of the case, however.
372
After heated debate, the second Bank of the United States was incor-
porated in 1816. 373 The creation of a national bank had been one of the
early issues that divided Federalists and Republicans. 37 4 Those who favored
in personam jurisdiction problems. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-
79. No definitive answer has been found.
366. See, e.g., Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136 (1839); Renner & Bussard
v. Marshal, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 215 (1816); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Barclay, 21 F. Cas. 212
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855) (No. 12,241).
367. See supra notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
368. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
369. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
370. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819-23 (1824).
371. As one student of Marshall's opinions has found, their common traits include:
great rhetorical power, invocation of the constitutional text less as the basis of
decision than as a peg on which to hang a result evidently reached on other
grounds, a marked disdain for reliance on precedent, extensive borrowing of the
ideas of others without attribution, an inclination to reach out for constitutional
issues that did not have to be decided, a tendency to resolve difficult questions
by aggressive assertion of one side of the case, and an absolute certainty in the
correctness of his conclusions.
Currie, supra note 207, at 661.
372. As one scholar has noted, "The political struggle between Federalists and Repub-
licans is centrally important to understanding John Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence."
Nelson, supra note 183, at 932.
373. Bank of the United States Act, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 (1816) (expired 1836).
374. Nelson, supra note 183, at 929; see generally 1 C. WARREtN, THE SuPREM COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 499-503 (rev. ed. 1926). Much of the resistance to a second Bank
was due to the general dislike of the first Bank of the United States. That dislike was
caused, in part, by the makeup of the first Bank. "[l]t was under almost complete control
of the Federalists (who, it was believed, used it as a political machine), . . . its stock was
largely held by British and other foreigners .... " 1 C. WARsEN, supra, at 504; accord, id.
at 504 n.2 (quoting Letter from Timothy Pickering to Judge Richard Peters (Jan. 30, 1811)).
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a strong federal government hailed the Bank as a "necessary and proper ' 3 75
institution, that is, one "conducive to the exercise of a power granted by
the constitution.' '31 76 They reasoned that "[tihe collection and administra-
tion of the public revenue is, of all others, the most important branch of
the public service .... The bank is, in effect, an instrument of the
government .... It is as much a servant of the government as the treasury
department."
7 7
Those who favored states' rights viewed the Bank differently. As one
Virginia Congressman said, "I fear [the Bank] may ultimately turn out to
be a dangerous, a very dangerous political machine to this coun-
try .... ",378 He feared that such a broad interpretation of the "necessary
and proper" clause "might sweep away ... every vestige of authority
reserved to the States.
' 3 79
Within two years, opposition to the Bank had spread from the purely
intellectual realm to become an issue in everyday life. The Bank's policies
had helped to ruin many state banks.380 In addition, due to mismanage-
ment, speculation, and fraud, the Bank was on "the verge of insol-
vency." '38 ' In reaction to this state of affairs, a number of States enacted
legislation to prevent the Bank from doing business within their borders.
382
One of those States, Ohio, imposed a tax of $50,000 on each branch of
the Bank.
3 3
The month following the passage of the Ohio tax, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,38 4 holding that a state
tax on the Bank was unconstitutional. This opinion "was greeted with an
outburst of indignation and even of actual defiance. ' 385 Opposition to the
decision in McCulloch was strongest in Ohio. 386 The state legislature
375. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
376. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) (defining "necessary
and proper").
377. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 810 (argument for
jurisdiction).
378. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 978 (1814) (statement of Rep. Clopton).
379. Id. at 980.
380. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 505.
381. Id. at 506.
382. These States included Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, North Car-
olina, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id. at 505-06.
383. Law of Feb. 8, 1819, ch. 83, § 1, 17 Ohio Laws 190, 191. To put the amount of
the Ohio tax in perspective, it should be noted that the capital of the Cincinnati branch of
the Bank was only $1,500,000, and that of the Chillicothe branch, $500,000. The tax was
greater than the Bank's entire dividends. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 795 (1824) (argument for respondents).
384. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This decision was announced on March 7, 1819.
Id. at 400. The Ohio tax was passed February 8, 1819. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 740
(statement of the case); see Law of Feb. 8, 1819, ch. 83, § 1, 17 Ohio Laws 190, 191.
385. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 504 (footnote omitted).
386. Id. at 526. A number of newspaper editorials denounced the decision on political
and legal grounds. Id. at 526-27. "Opposition to the Court's decision in Ohio, however,
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decided to disregard the case, claiming that it was a collusive one. 317
Because Ohio clearly planned to collect its tax, the Bank filed a bill
in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Ohio on September
11, 1819, praying for an injunction to restrain the auditor of the State of
Ohio from collecting the tax.3 11 On September 14, the court awarded the
injunction. 389 The auditor, however, considered the service of the injunction
to be defective, so he ignored it.39o Instead, on September 17, he sent
someone to the Bank's Chillicothe branch who collected the tax.3 9 ' The
Bank's lawyers "quickly completed service of the injunction" on Septem-
ber 18.392 The State did not, however, return the money.
A year later, the Bank filed an amended bill praying for, inter alia,
a decree to restore the money.39 3 The court awarded the requested relief
in September 1821. When the state treasurer refused to comply with the
decree, he was imprisoned and the key to the state treasury was forcibly
taken from him.394 Amidst great public debate,3 5 the Ohio officials ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.
396
In oral argument, the parties addressed a number of issues, such as
the power of a court of equity to enjoin a trespass, the effect of the
eleventh amendment on suits against state officials, and the power of a
State to tax the Bank.3 97 After these arguments, however, the Court asked
for a reargument of the case and a companion case, Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia.398 The issue the Court wanted ad-
dressed was "the constitutionality and effect of the provision in the charter
of the bank, which authorizes it to sue in the circuit courts of the
Union.' 3
99
was based not so much on political or legal grounds as on the financial and economic
conditions then existing. No State had suffered more in 1818 from wild inflation and
commercial failures than had Ohio ...." Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).
387. Id. at 528-29; see id. at 529 n.1 (quoting Report of Committee of Ohio Legislature,
Dec. 12, 1820). The attorney general of Maryland and United States officials had agreed to
the facts and cooperated to make McCulloch a test case. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at
506.
388. Id. at 529.
389. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 740-41 (1824) (statement
of case).
390. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 529.
391. Id.; accord, Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 741 (statement of case).
392. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 530.
393. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 741 (statement of case). The Bank also filed an
action at law for trespass. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 533 & n.2.
394. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 533-34.
395. Id. at 534-35.
396. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 744 (statement of case).
397. Id. at 744-804 (arguments for appellants and respondents).
398. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). In Planters' Bank, the right of the Bank of the
United States to sue on a promissory note was at issue. Id.
399. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 804 (statement of case). The Bank's charter gave
it the power "to sue and be sued ... in any circuit court of the United States." Bank of
United States Act, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 266, 269 (1816) (expired 1836).
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The reargument was not heard until March 11, 1824. At that time,
counsel arguing against jurisdiction 400 asserted that if the charter provision
granted federal jurisdiction in every case in which the Bank was a party,40 '
it would be unconstitutional. The only arguably applicable clause of article
III was that permitting jurisdiction over "all Cases . . . arising under this
Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States. '40 2 Yet, the suits in
Osborn and Planters' Bank did not arise under a law of the United States;
they arose under the local laws of trespass and contract. Moreover, in
Planters' Bank "no question can arise, except under the law of con-
tract .... No law of congress is drawn into question, and its correct
decision cannot possibly depend upbn the construction of such law.
'403
No federal court could have jurisdiction over such a case.
In Osborn a question would arise under the Constitution, but only in
reply to a justification by the defendants. 404 Under those circumstances, a
federal court could take cognizance of the case. 405 At that time, however,
the only provision giving such jurisdiction was section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,406 which provided for appeal to the Supreme Court from a
400. The argument for jurisdiction is not particularly relevant to the present discussion.
For a summary of the argument, see Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 805-11 (argument for
jurisdiction).
401. Counsel had argued first that the charter provision in question only empowered
the Bank to bring suit in a federal circuit court in those cases over which the circuit courts
already had jurisdiction. Id. at 811-14 (argument against jurisdiction) (relying on Bank of
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809)). This power to sue would have been'
extremely limited. The circuit courts only had original jurisdiction over diversity cases and
suits between citizens of the same State suing under land grants from different States.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77. At that time, a corporation was
considered to be a citizen of every State of which its members were citizens. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91. Hence, in a suit by the Bank, complete diversity, as required by
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), would be rare.
402. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1, cl. 1. Clauses three (admiralty jurisdiction) and
eight (suits disputing land grants) were clearly inapplicable. See id. cls. 3, 8. The judicial
power of the United States extends not only to certain cases depending on the nature of
the suit, however. It also extends to certain cases depending on the character of the party.
But counsel also reasoned that that type of jurisdiction was inapplicable. If jurisdiction over
a suit by the Bank is based on the character of the party, i.e., the Bank, counsel argued,
it extends beyond the scope of the Constitution. Jurisdiction based on the character of the
party is limited to those categories listed in article III (e.g., diverse citizens and ambassadors).
See id. cls. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9. Since the Bank is not included in those categories, there can be
no jurisdiction over a suit simply because it is a party. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 813-
14 (argument against jurisdiction). For the text of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1, see
supra note 211.
403. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 815 (argument against jurisdiction) (emphasis added);
see supra note 398.
404. The bill sought to enjoin a trespass by state officials. The defendants' justification
would be the state statute. In reply to that justification, the Bank would cite McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to argue that the statute was unconstitutional.
See Currie, supra note 207, at 695 n.303.
405. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 814 (argument against jurisdiction).
406. Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
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final judgment of the highest court of the State. If Congress wished to
extend this jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, counsel urged, it must
have done so unequivocally. It did not.
40 7
Chief Justice Marshall began the discussion of the charter provision's
constitutionality48 by averring that "[tihe appellants contend, that [the
case] does not [arise under a law of the United States], because several
questions may arise in it, which depend on the general principles of the
law, not on any act of congress. ' ' 409 Counsel had not contended any such
thing.410 Yet with this misstatement of counsel's argument, the Chief Justice
posed the question implicitly answered in The Mary Ford: could a federal
court decide nonfederal questions that arose in a federal case? His answer
was the same as the earlier court's. If a federal court has jurisdiction,
"then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which
gives that jurisdiction.
' '41
That Marshall discussed the doctrine without citation of precedent was
nothing new. He was known for his general practice of not citing any
authority. 4 2 He also, on at least one prior occasion, addressed at length
an argument foreclosed by an earlier opinion. He actually retraced the
reasoning in the earlier opinion without much reference to it. 4 3
In Osborn, however, Marshall went beyond rediscussing an already-
decided issue. He actually made up an argument so he could address the
doctrine. This fabrication is especially puzzling because the question as it
arose in Osborn was not at all controversial. Counsel had not missed an
important step in their argument. No one would have suggested that a
federal court had to choose between answering only the federal questions
407. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 814-16 (argument against jurisdiction).
408. Marshall first decided that the Bank's charter authorized it to sue in federal court.
Id. at 817-18.
409. Id. at 819.
410. Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see id. at 811-16 (argument against jurisdic-
tion); supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text.
411. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822. Marshall then discussed the limits of the
"arising under" jurisdiction. Id. at 823-28. Whether a case "arises under" a federal law is
a complex question in itself, and will not be dealt with in this Article. For a discussion of
federal question jurisdiction, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 983-88; M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 53-77 (1980); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 6, §§ 17-18, 20.
412. P. DUPONCEAU, supra note 200, at xxiv; Currie, supra note 207, at 656, 661, 689-
90, 699. Marshall was not alone in this practice. At that time, Lord Mansfield was influential
on American jurisprudence. "[H]is lighthearted disregard for precedent, his joyous accep-
tance of the idea that judges are supposed to make the law-the more law the better-
became a notable feature of our early jurisprudence." G. GILMORE, supra note 200, at 24.
413. Compare Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323-52 (1816), with
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-23 (1821). In Cohens, Marshall "wrote ten
pages retracing Martin's reasoning, without attribution or noticeable improvement." Currie,
supra note 207, at 689. Another example of such unnecessary discussion of an already-
decided issue is Marshall's discussion of the merits in Osborn. "[T]ypically, he felt it
necessary to retrace much of [McCulloch's] reasoning .... " Id. at 695 n.301.
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in a case and giving up jurisdiction entirely. One must ask, why, then,
did he go to the trouble in Osborn to discuss the doctrine? The answer
reveals whether the opinion changes the ancient notion of the power of a
court to answer questions outside its jurisdiction.
It was important to Marshall that there be federal jurisdiction in this
case. Without federal jurisdiction, the Bank might not have been able to
survive. 414 To recognize jurisdiction in this case, however, required diplo-
macy. First, a federalist-controlled Congress only once had given general
federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, and the Repub-
licans had revoked it almost immediately.4 5 The proper scope of federal
jurisdiction was still a point of disagreement between the parties.4 6 Second,
Marshall had read narrowly an earlier provision granting the Bank the
right to sue in any competent court. 417 Last, the facts in this case gave it
much sensitivity. 418 The eyes of the Nation were on Marshall.
The discussion of the doctrine thus may have been a rhetorical tactic
to make the rest of his opinion more palatable. The misstatement of the
argument cast counsel against the jurisdiction in the position of arguing
a ridiculous point. No one could agree with their supposed argument.
Even Justice Johnson, "the first dissenter,
'41 9 accepted this position. 420
By starting in a position of strength, Marshall could proceed to other,
weaker arguments without as much resistance on the part of the reader. 41
If the discussion of the doctrine were merely a rhetorical device, and
the sole reason for it were to assure the Bank's survival, the discussion
would not be particularly relevant to the development of the doctrine.
There may have been, however, another motive behind Marshall's decision
414. As the dissent noted, "a state of things has now grown up, in some of the states,
which renders all the protection necessary, that the general government can give to this
bank. The policy of the decision is obvious, that is, if the bank is to be sustained ...."
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting). At least one historian would
minimize this fear, however. According to Charles Warren, "[w]hen, after many delays
attendant upon its argument in the Court, the case was finally decided in 1824, it had
become almost wholly a dead issue." I C. WARREN, supra note 374, at 538 (footnote
omitted).
415. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 11-14, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8,
1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
416. See supra note 207.
417. See supra note 401.
418. See supra notes 373-96 and accompanying text.
419. This epithet was inspired by the book, D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLI JOHNSON:
THE FIRsT DISSENTER (1954).
420. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 884 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). Johnson's unquestioning acceptance of the doctrine is important because "[i]t
was Johnson's leading rule to construe strictly grants of jurisdiction, whether constitutional
or statutory." D. MORGAN, supra note 419, at 86.
421. Marshall had used this technique in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). R. McCLOsKEY, THE AmERicAN SUPREME COURT 42-44 (1960); Currie, supra note
207, at 657, 660. He also used it in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Currie, supra note 207, at 688.
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to discuss it. He "typical[ly] ... disdained reliance on British prece-
dents. '422 He believed that:
the court will not review [English] decisions, because it is thought,
a question growing out of the constitution of the United States,
requires rather an attentive consideration of the words of that
instrument, than of the decisions of analogous questions by the
courts of any other country. 42
3
Although the authority for the holding in The Mary Ford was unstated,
the winning side had cited Blackstone. 424 Instead of referring to Blackstone
or any other English authority, in Osborn Marshall turned to article III
and found that its language adopted the doctrine. The drafters' use of the
word "Cases" indicated an implicit acceptance of the notion that cases
do not always come in neat jurisdictional packages. "On the opposite
construction, [Marshall noted,] the [federal] judicial power never can be
extended to a whole case, as expressed by the constitution .... "425 There-
fore, Congress may give the federal courts jurisdiction over entire cases,
not just federal questions. 426
The doctrine was not changed by the discussion in Osborn. The real
importance of the case is that it clearly states that the doctrine was given
an imprimatur by the Constitution. In that sense Osborn was unique. The
other cases that applied the doctrine in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries did not self-consciously question their authority.4 27 Instead, the
cases simply accepted the doctrine as a part of normal "courtly" powers.
Moreover, despite the importance modern scholars place on Osborn as
authority for the doctrine, it was evidently not so considered by contem-
poraries. The case was not cited to support the doctrine until almost a
half century later, 428 despite numerous decisions applying the doctrine in
the intervening forty-three years.4 29
422. Currie, supra note 207, at 699 (footnote omitted); see G. HASKINS & H. JomsoN,
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-15, at 442 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Devise
History of the Supreme Court Vol. 2, 1981) (personal prediliction formed resistance to
English law).
423. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 851 (discussing doctrine of sovereign immunity).
424. See supra note 229 and accompanying text; cf. text accompanying supra note 178
(cited words of Blackstone).
425. See supra note 229 and accompanying text; cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. I
(judicial power of United States extended to "Cases").
426. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. One could argue that Congress must give the
federal courts jurisdiction over entire cases, since "It]he courts of the United States do not
sit to decide questions of law presented in a vacuum, but only such questions as arise in a
'case or controversy.' " C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 53.
427. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
428. See Mayor of Nashville v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 253 (1867) (approving removal
jurisdiction although federal question only arises in defendant's answer).
429. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 457 (1861); Taylor v. Carryl,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 596-97 (1858); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 621 (1849);
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V. THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. From the Rules of Equity to Gibbs
The Federal Rules of Equity, which became effective in 1913,430
contained a number of innovative changes in equity pleading and practice.
Important to this inquiry were several changes regarding the joinder of
claims in one suit. 43' Rule 26 expressly allowed the plaintiff to join in one
suit any claims he or she had against the defendant. 4 2 In addition, rule
30 allowed the defendant to join any counterclaims against the plaintiff
in the same suit. 433 This change in procedure did not materially affect the
basic jurisdictional doctrine, however. If a separate nonfederal proceeding
could be heard in federal court, afortiori, a federal court could hear the
same nonfederal claim when actually filed in the original federal proceed-
ing.
A defendant always had been allowed to file a cross-bill against the
plaintiff so that the court could award complete relief between the par-
ties. 434 Before the rules went into effect, a proper cross-bill "touch[ed] the
matters in question in the original bill. ' 43 5 This relatively vague description
was translated in rule 30 as the compulsory counterclaim, which was one
"arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit. ' 436
The federal courts took the procedural change in stride, equating such a
counterclaim with the old cross-bill. 437 They, therefore, applied the same
jurisdictional rules to the new context. Just as with the cross-bill, 43 a
counterclaim against the plaintiff that arose out of the same transaction
as plaintiff's claim was considered part of the same case as the original
claim. The counterclaim therefore needed no independent basis for juris-
diction.
49
see also Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 541 (1850); Hickey's Lessee v. Stewart,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 750, 762 (1845); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 599-600
(1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 511 (1839);
Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 478 (1836); Thompson v. Tolmie, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 157, 169 (1829); Elliott v. Piersol's Lessee, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 328 (1828).
430. Fed. R. Equity 81, 226 U.S. 673 (1912).
431. See supra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
432. 226 U.S. at 655.
433. Id. at 657. In addition, rule 37 provided: "Anyone claiming an interest in the
litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention .... " Id. at 659.
434. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
435. J. STORY, supra note 157, § 389.
436. 226 U.S. at 657.
437. "The counterclaim constituted what was formerly known, in the equity practice,
as a cross-bill." Mathis v. Ligon, 39 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1930); accord, Kaumagraph
Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Electric Boat
Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 215 F. 377, 380 (D.N.J. 1914).
438. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., Mathis v. Ligon, 39 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1930); Kaumagraph Co.
v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Badger v. E.B. Badger
& Sons Co., 288 F. 419 (D. Mass. 1923); Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 215
F. 377, 383 (D.N.J. 1914).
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When the Supreme Court decided Moore v. New York Cotton Ex-
change,"0 it did not even address, let alone question, this conclusion. In
that case, the Court was faced with a federal claim and a nonfederal
counterclaim. It dismissed the claim and decided the counterclaim in
defendant's favor.44 Plaintiff argued that the claim had been dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore the court could not decide the
counterclaim." 2 In other words, plaintiff argued, no federal case was
before the court, so it could decide none of the issues presented to it. The
Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that the claim had been
dismissed on the merits. 44 3 A federal case was before the trial court, and,
therefore, the court could dispose of the other issues in the case, including
the nonfederal counterclaim.
The plaintiff next argued that, even if there were a federal case, the
nonfederal counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction as the
plaintiff's claim. 4" The counterclaim was thus not part of the federal case.
The Court ruled that " '[t]ransaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It
may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much
upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relation-
ship. 14 5 The two claims in the present case had a logical relationship.
They were, therefore, part of the same case, and the federal court could
decide them both.
44 6
Modern scholars view this opinion as an important change in the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over nonfederal claims. They suggest that
"ancillary jurisdiction" was now no longer a doctrine of necessity,44 7 but
one of convenience. 448 A careful reading of the Moore Court's language
shows that this theory is inaccurate. The Court's rationale for finding the
two claims to be part of the same case was that "the relief afforded by
the dismissal of the bill is not complete without'' 449 granting the relief
asked for in the counterclaim. Since a federal court had jurisdiction to
440. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
441. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926).
442. Id. at 607-08.
443. Id. at 609. The dismissal on the merits did not oust the court of jurisdiction over
the counterclaim. See supra notes 313-35 and accompanying text.
444. 270 U.S. at 608.
445. Id. at 610.
446. Id.
447. For a discussion of the basis for the doctrine, rejecting this theory, see supra notes
366-67 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KaE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2.14, at
76; C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9, at 29; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3523, at 93; Freer, supra note 1, at 51; Matasar, "One Constitutibnal Case,"
supra note 1, at 1411-12; Matasar, Primer, supra note 1, at 142; Miller, supra note 1, at
1-2, 5; Minahan, supra note 1, at 281 & n.8, 299; Schenkier, supra note 1, at 277; Shakman,
supra note 1, at 279; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 947, 949; UCLA Comment, supra note 1,
at 1266; VA. Note, supra note 1, at 268, 273; YALE Note, supra note 1, at 643; see supra
note 51 and accompanying text.
449. 270 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
PENDENT AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
afford complete relief,450 the federal court was correct in ruling on the
counterclaim.
Moore's importance was not in establishing a new jurisdictional rule.
The plaintiff did not argue that even if the counterclaim arose out of the
same transaction as the claim, there would be no federal jurisdiction. That
conclusion was beyond question. Moore's importance was the clarification
of the dividing line between compulsory counterclaims and permissive
ones. The permissive counterclaim, which had no relation to the original
bill, 451 was a new procedural device. Not all the federal courts took this
procedural change in stride. Some courts actually would not permit such
a claim, even if there would have been jurisdiction over it.452 This reluc-
tance was soon overcome, however, and unrelated counterclaims were
allowed in the same suit as plaintiff's original claim. But the federal courts
never considered this new counterclaim to be part of the same "case" as




Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Equity provided that a plaintiff "may
join in one bill as many causes of action, cognizable in equity, as he may
have against the defendant. ' 454 The federal courts followed the same
principles governing complete relief that had been developed earlier.
4 5
1 If
plaintiff joined a nonfederal claim with a federal one, the court inquired
whether the two claims were part of the same case. If so, the federal
court could hear the nonfederal claim.
4 56
Application of the doctrine under the new procedure gave the federal
courts trouble in one substantive area. Often, a plaintiff would file a
claim alleging trademark or patent infringement, coupled with a nonfederal
claim seeking relief for unfair competition. 45 7 The federal courts were split
450. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
451. Fed. R. Equity 30, 226 U.S. 631, 657 (1912).
452. See, e.g., Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Machine Co. v. Giles, 212 F. 452 (D. Mass.
1914); Adamson v. Shaler, 208 F. 566 (E.D. Wis. 1913); Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer
Co. v. Kinsey Mfg. Co., 205 F. 375 (W.D.N.Y. 1913); Terry Steam Turbine Co. v. B.F.
Sturtevant Co., 204 F. 103 (D. Mass. 1913).
453. See, e.g., Kaumagraph Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Universal Radiator Products Co. v. Craftsman Radiator Enclosure Co., 2
F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Badger v. E.B. Badger & Sons Co., 288 F. 419, 420
(D. Mass. 1923); see also Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926) (declining
to decide question).
454. 226 U.S. at 655.
455. See supra notes 288-301 and accompanying text.
456. See Geneva Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 238 U.S. 254, 259 (1915);
Gallardo v. Santini Fertilizer Co., 11 F.2d 587, 589 (Ist Cir. 1926); Tullar & Tullar v.
Illinois Central R.R., 213 F. 280, 283 (N.D. Iowa 1914).
457. In addition, a defendant might file a nonfederal counterclaim alleging unfair trade
practices to plaintiff's claim for infringement. The federal courts viewed this procedural
posture in the same way as the joinder of the claims by plaintiff. See, e.g., Kaumagrapti
Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. National Electric Signaling Co., 206 F. 295, 300-01
(E.D.N.Y. 1913).
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on two questions. First, could the court exercise jurisdiction over the
nonfederal claim at all? 458 Second, those courts that held jurisdiction was
appropriate were split over whether the court could retain that jurisdiction
after the federal claim was decided adversely to the plaintiff.4 9 The
Supreme Court answered both those questions in the affirmative in Hum
v. Oursler.
4 0
The Hum Court noted that the issue before it was the same as the
issue in Moore.4 61 Under rule 30, the question faced by a federal court
was whether the counterclaim was "a part of the case sought to be stated
in the bill. '462 The same question faced the court if plaintiff was the party
who joined the two claims together. Rule 30, however, divided claims into
those that were part of the same "case" and those that were not.463 Rule
26 did not make any such distinction. Therefore, the Hum Court described
the dividing line for the lower federal courts:
where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action
are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, ...
the federal court, even though the federal ground be not estab-
lished, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the
non-federal ground .... 464
Contemporaries did not see these opinions as stating the rules for two
separate doctrines. Federal courts applying the doctrine cited rule 26 and
rule 30 cases interchangeably. 465 As Charles Clark commented about the
application of the doctrine, the federal courts "usually ifse that word
'same transaction,' [when testing a counterclaim] and if [joinder of the
nonfederal claim] is by parties who are all on the same side of the case,
they [the courts] use the phrase 'same cause of action.' "466 Use of different
458. See, e.g., Payton v. Ideal Jewelry Mfg. Co., 7 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1925); W.F.
Burns Co. v. Automatic Recording Safe Co., 241 F. 472, 486 (7th Cir. 1916); United States
Expansion Bolt Co. v. H.G. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234 F. 868, 872-75 (7th Cir. 1916);
Planten v. Gednay, 224 F. 382, 386 (2d Cir. 1915); Ludwigs v. Payson Mfg. Co., 206 F.
60, 65 (7th Cir. 1913); Recamier Mfg. Co. v. Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc., 59 F.2d 802,
806 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
459. See, e.g., Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F.2d 991, 992-95 (6th Cir. 1926);
Taylor v. Bostick, 299 F. 232 (3d Cir. 1924); Detroit Showcase Co. v. Kawneer Mfg. Co.,
250 F. 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1918); Mallinson v. Ryan, 242 F. 951, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Sprigg
v. Fisher, 222 F. 964 (D. Md. 1915).
460. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
461. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 242 (1933).
462. Id.
463. See supra notes 434-39 & 451-53 and accompanying text.
464. 289 U.S. at 246 (emphasis in original).
465. See, e.g., United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. H.G. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234
F. 868, 872-75 (7th Cir. 1916); Kaumagraph Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp.
230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Frankart, Inc. v. Metal Lamp Corp., 32 F.2d 920, 922 (E.D.N.Y.
1929); Badger v. E.B. Badger & Sons Co., 288 F. 419, 420 (D. Mass. 1923).
466. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES AT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 60 (E. Hammond ed. 1938) [hereinafter WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS].
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terminology did not indicate a different principle; it simply would make
no sense to suggest that a defendant's counterclaim was part of the same
cause of action as a plaintiff's claim.
In 1938, with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the procedural innovations of the Rules of Equity were extended to actions
at law.467 The Advisory Committee expected the new rules to dovetail with
the doctrine, just as the Rules of Equity had.468 Indeed, the federal courts
applied the same jurisdictional rules to analogous claims brought under
the new rules.
469
The new Federal Rules added two procedures, however, that enlarged
the size of a suit. First, a defendant could now file a claim solely against
another defendant without resorting to a separate cross-bill. 470 Second, a
defendant could implead a nonparty, seeking indemnity or contribution. 47'
The federal courts had seen such claims before. Defendants in equity had
long been able to file claims against co-defendants through a cross-bill.
472
Impleader was allowed in a few States, such as New York, 473 and therefore
could be used in actions at law in the federal courts in those States. 474
The federal courts had not considered either of these claims to be part of
the original case, however, unless plaintiff was interested in the relief
sought by defendants. 475 Once the procedures were expressly allowed by
the Federal Rules, though, the federal courts had no trouble finding that
the newly-allowed claims were part of the case presented to them for
467. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b), 18, 24.
468. The Advisory Committee was very aware that the federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 specifically provides that the Federal Rules cannot
enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The rules regarding joinder of parties and
claims were drafted with this limitation in mind. Dean Charles E. Clark, Reporter to the
Advisory Committee, summarized the doctrine in 1938 as follows: "no new jurisdiction is
required in matters which arise out of the matter in suit by the plaintiff." WAsImNGToN
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 466, at 60 (emphasis added). That same phrase, "arise out of,"
was used to limit the scope of most of the new Federal Rules dealing with joinder of parties
and claims. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (g), 14(a), 20; cf. id. 19, 23, 24. Moreover, the
Moore Court used the term "occurrence" to describe "transaction." See supra note 445
and accompanying text. The advisory committee thus used both of the approved terms. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (g), 14(a), 20.
469. See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d
Cir. 1961); Schram v. Lucking, 31 F. Supp. 749 (D. Mich. 1940); Dewey & Almy Chem.
Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
470. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
471. Id. 14.
472. See supra notes 276-87 and accompanying text.
473. N.Y. CiV. PROc. L. & R. § 193, subd. 2.
474. See supra note 352.
475. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 68 F.2d 445, 447-
48 (5th Cir. 1934); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Suits, 40 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1930);
Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Line, Inc., 28 F.2d. 897, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Wilson v.
United American Lines, 21 F.2d 872, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1927); Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian
Mining Co., 146 F. 166, 177 (C.C.D. Mont. 1906); see also supra notes 282-87 and
accompanying text.
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determination. They reasoned that to hear these claims would, contrary
to prior belief, enable them to "do complete justice" and "dispose of the
entire controversy.' '476
In one area, an archaic procedural concept hampered the use of the
doctrine. "[T]he meaning of 'cause of action' was a subject of serious
dispute; the phrase might 'mean one thing for one purpose and something
different for another.' -477 Partially due to this confusion,478 the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The Rules rejected the rigid "cause
of action" concept, 479 and adopted a very flexible approach to the structure
of a suit. 4 0 Unfortunately, the test for the exercise of jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's nonfederal claim remained wedded to the old notion of "cause
of action." '48 ' From the time Hum was decided until Gibbs, "there ha[d]
been some tendency to limit [the] application [of the doctrine to plaintiff's
nonfederal claim] to cases in which the state and federal claims [were], as
476. Arizona Lead Mines, Inc. v. Sullivan Mining Co., 3 F.R.D. 135, 139 (D. Idaho
1943); accord, USF&G Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Carter Oil Co. v.
Wood, 30 F. Supp. 875, 876 (E.D. Ill. 1940); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.,
29 F. Supp. 757 (D. Conn. 1939); Satink v. Twp. of Holland, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D.N.J.
1939); Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md. 1939).
477. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722-23 (quoting United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288
U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933))(footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the various meanings given
to the term, "cause of action," see C. CLARK, supra note 138, § 19; J. FRIEDENTHiAL, M.K.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 5.4.
478. "[T]he [Advisory C]ommittee was committed to promoting a simple system of
allegation and defense." C. CLARK, supra note 138, at 147.
479. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 2.06c (2d ed. 1987); Blume, The Scope
of a Civil Action, 42 MICH. L. REv. 257, 261 (1943).
480. "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope
of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is
strongly encouraged." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724 (footnote omitted); accord, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES AT CLEVELAND, OHIO 247-48
(W. Dawson ed. 1938); see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13-14, 17-25.
481. See supra notes 36 & 464 and accompanying text. Pendent jurisdiction is not the
only area in which the Supreme Court seemed to cling to the old concept of "cause of
action." Compare American Fire & Casualty v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951), decided 13 years
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. In that case, "the Court was
forced to plunge into the murky waters of what is a cause of action." C. WRIGHT, supra
note 6, § 39, at 221. At issue in Finn was the meaning of the newly-amended 28 U.S.C. §
1441(c) (1948). Section 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand
all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
(emphasis added). The Court deliberately rejected the modern term, "claim," and chose to
focus on the more difficult term, "cause of action," saying that it had to determine "the
meaning ascribed to 'separate and independent ... cause of action.' " 341 U.S. at 12
(deletion in original). To this day, removal under § 1441(c) is tied to the old notion, "cause
of action." As one scholar noted, "the statute's utility is greatly outweighed by the confusion
it has engendered." C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 39, at 225.
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in Hum, 'little more than the equivalent of different epithets to charac-
terize the same group of circumstances.' "482
The Supreme Court set this state of affairs to rights in 1966 in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.4 3 The plaintiff's nonfederal claim in Gibbs might
have passed the "cause of action" test. 48 4 The Supreme Court, however,
found "[tihis limited approach ... unnecessarily grudging." 4 5 The Court
noted that the inquiry is not whether the two claims before a federal court
fit into a now-archaic procedural concept. Instead, the inquiry is whether
"the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits
the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case.' "46
To define the concept "case," the Court looked beyond the confusing
term "cause of action" to the policies underlying the doctrine. The Gibbs
Court found that "[t]he Court in Hum identified what it meant by the
term by citation of Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,4 7 . . . a case in which
'cause of action' had been used to identify the operative scope of the
doctrine of res judicata. ' 41s Thus:
the citation of Baltimore S.S. Co. shows that the Court found
that the weighty policies of judicial economy and fairness to parties
reflected in res judicata doctrine were in themselves strong counsel
for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to
dispose of the state as well as the federal claims.
48 9
The very same policies are reflected in the Rules. 4 0 Hence, to adopt an
approach to the doctrine that was more in line with the modern procedure
set out in the Rules would not do violence to the Hum rationale. With
these policies in mind, the Court developed the now-famous Gibbs "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact test."
49'
B. Aldinger and Owen
Just ten scant years after the Supreme Court decided Gibbs, it released
the first of two opinions 492 that unduly narrowed the scope of the doctrine.
482. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
483. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
484. See United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52, 59-60 (6th
Cir. 1959) (claims for secondary boycott and unlawful conspiracy to injure business are
different grounds to support single cause of action). The Supreme Court in Gibbs posed
the question whether the state claim could be heard by a federal court under the Hum test.
The Court never answered the question, however. 383 U.S. at 722.
485. Id. at 725.
486. Id.
487. 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
488. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 723 (footnote added).
489. Id. at 724.
490. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
491. For a statement of the test, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
492. A third case, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), was just decided
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In that decade, the lower federal courts were split on two possible appli-
cations of the doctrine. One was whether it covered the new hybrid
situation called "pendent parties, ' 493 and the other was whether a plaintiff
could file a nonfederal claim against a third-party defendant. 4 4 The
Supreme Court addressed those questions in two cases, Aldinger v.
Howard4 5 and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.
49 6
In Aldinger the Court was faced with a pendent defendant. Plaintiff
attempted to join a nonfederal claim against one defendant with a federal
claim against another defendant. In deciding whether to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the nonfederal claim, the Court purported to rely on the history
of the doctrine. 497 The Court made two crucial mistakes, however. First,
it accepted the notion that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction were histor-
ically discrete doctrines. Second, its reasoning did not reflect the historical
basis for the doctrine at all.
The Court did not even address the traditional notion that a federal
court will award complete relief to a party who seeks its aid. Instead, the
Court noted that " '... the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available
without question in the state courts.' ",498 With this mischaracterization of
the doctrine's basis, it is no wonder the Court was antipathetic to the
doctrine. Rejecting a party's pleas is much easier when the basis for the
last term. That opinion, however, does not materially change the doctrine as set out in
Aldinger and Owen. It cautions that pendent party jurisdiction will only be exercised if it
is clear that Congress intended it to be.
493. For a definition of "pendent parties," see supra note 22. Pendent party jurisdiction
was accepted by the following circuit courts of appeals: First, Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d
843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Second, Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1971); Third, Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149, 153-55 (3d Cir.
1968); Fourth, Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Fifth, Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); Sixth, Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins.
Ass'n, 431 F.2d 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970); Eighth, Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1969); and Tenth, Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618, 621 (10th Cir. 1973). Pendent party jurisdiction was rejected by the
Seventh Circuit, Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974), and the Ninth Circuit, Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1969).
494. See, e.g., Reiser v. District of Columbia, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kroger
v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 417 (1978);
Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972); Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D.
Kan. 1975); Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Buresch
v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry.,
271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967); see also Note, Rule 14(a) and Ancillary Jurisdiction:
Plaintiff's Claim Against Non-Diverse Third-Party Defendant, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
796 (1976).
495. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
496. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
497. See 427 U.S. at 6-13.
498. Id. at 15 (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894
(4th Cir. 1972)).
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jurisdiction invoked is deemed to be solely for the party's "efficiency."
It is a different matter when the rationale is fairness to the parties,
minimizing problems for litigants caused by a dual court system.
Having misconstrued the basis for the doctrine, the Court set up a
test for pendent party jurisdiction, which limited the relief plaintiff could
receive. First, the Court suggested that the Gibbs "common nucleus of
operative fact" test applied to pendent parties' claims as well. 499 That test
was only the first hurdle, however. Second, the Court mistakenly sought
a specific statutory basis for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction.
The inquiry was as follows: "whether by virtue of the statutory grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal claim against
the [federal defendant] rests, Congress has addressed itself to the party as
to whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim is sought." 5°° As
Professors Richard Matasar and Richard Freer have clearly demonstrated,
this requirement is unnecessary.50' It is true that the lower federal courts
cannot act without a statutory grant of jurisdiction.50 2 Once that grant is
made for a certain class of cases, however, all the questions in such a
case are included in the court's jurisdiction.503 If Congress gives the federal
courts jurisdiction over a "case,'' 5 4 the courts may award complete relief
between the parties.
The Supreme Court's new-found antipathy to plaintiffs led it to restrict
the application of the doctrine further in Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger. 5 In that case, the Court refused to exercise "ancillary
jurisdiction" over a plaintiff's nonfederal claim against a third-party
defendant. The Court opined that:
the nonfederal claim here was asserted by the plaintiff, who
voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law claim in a federal
court.... A plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction
does not encompass all of his possible claims in a case such as
this one, since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the
state forum and must thus accept its limitations.506
Instead, the Court found that "claims by a defending party haled into
court against his will"507 were favored. The Court, therefore, held that,
499. See id. at 9, 13, 14-16; see also Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006-07
(1989).
500. 427 U.S. at 16 (emphasis in original). The Court requires that Congress be clear
in addressing itself to a pendent party. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
501. See Freer, supra note 1; Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 1.
Professors Freer and Matasar have thoroughly analyzed this fallacy in the Aldinger-Owen
requirements. Their arguments will not be restated here.
502. C. WaIH, supra note 6, at 22.
503. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
504. One might even argue that Congress cannot give the federal courts jurisdiction
over less than the entire case. See supra note 426.
505. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
506. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978).
507. Id.
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in addition to the statutory analysis required by Aldinger, a federal court
faced with a nonfederal, nonpendent claim had to examine the posture of
the parties to the claim
°.50
With this restriction, the Court turned the traditional notion of juris-
diction on its head. The posture of the parties to the nonfederal claim
had not mattered. 09 Before Owen, plaintiffs who properly sought the
court's aid had received complete relief from the federal courts. 10 If there
had been any limitation on the posture of the parties, it was to limit the
rights of defending parties. While defendants were able to assert their
claims against the plaintiff, the defendants had initially been limited in
seeking relief against co-defendants and third parties.51' Thus, the party
who had originally been, at least arguably, disfavored has become the
favored party. At the same time, the injured party 12 seeking the court's
aid is now denied complete relief.
C. A Suggested Analysis
First, we must recognize the basic jurisdictional doctrine of complete
relief. We must reject as inaccurate and confusing the notion that the
doctrine is divided into separate categories. All nonfederal claims asserted
in federal cases should be subject to a uniform inquiry: does the nonfederal
claim allow the federal court to award complete relief?
Second, we should recognize that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were drafted with this jurisdictional doctrine in mind. All claims that arise
out of the transaction or occurrence of a plaintiff's federal claim would
have traditionally been considered part of the same case. They should be
deemed so today. Thus, for example, a compulsory counterclaim or
intervention as of right are part of the initial federal case, and no
independent basis for jurisdiction is necessary.
Third, the use of the synonymous "common nucleus of operative
fact" language only confuses matters. First, it reinforces the mistaken
notion that plaintiffs' nonfederal claims are different from other nonfed-
eral claims. Second, use of the Gibbs language ignores the careful drafting
of the Rules to reflect the doctrine of complete relief. Because plaintiffs'
claims were treated no differently than other claims, we should simply
adopt the same dividing line: plaintiffs' nonfederal claims that arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence as their federal claims are part of
the same federal case and can be heard in federal court.
The Owen Court feared that if that were the rule, a crafty plaintiff
could manipulate a federal court's jurisdiction "by the simple expedient
508. Id. at 373. For the exact statement of the test for "ancillary jurisdiction," see
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 295, 300-01 & 304-05 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 288-301 & 304-05 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
512. Plaintiff's allegations are deemed to be true at this stage of the proceedings.
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of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting
for them to implead nondiverse defendants. ' 5 13 Yet the federal courts have
always had the inherent power to protect their jurisdiction from such
manipulation. 514 If the court fears plaintiff is acting in such a way, it need
not hear the nonfederal claim. But this fear should not cause us to disfavor
the time-honored rule that a plaintiff may choose his or her defendant.
If plaintiff's claim against the chosen defendant is cognizable in federal
court, the court should endeavor to give that plaintiff complete relief. If
others are subsequently made parties to the suit, absent manipulation or
collusion by plaintiff, the court should entertain plaintiff's nonfederal
claims against them, if necessary to award complete relief.
Under this traditional doctrine, pendent plaintiffs would not be al-
lowed. Most often, whether one plaintiff gets relief does not make the
relief given to another plaintiff any more complete. Thus, while the federal
claimant could sue in federal court, the nonfederal plaintiff could not. If
the court could not grant relief to either the federal or nonfederal plaintiff
unless they joined together, the federal court would not hear either
claimant.515 Thus, in neither situation could the nonfederal plaintiff sue
in federal court.
The same result would be true of pendent defendants, with at least
one exception. When plaintiff's claim against the federal defendant can
only be heard in federal court, Congress has exacerbated the problems of
a dual court system. Plaintiff with two claims arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence must split them between two different courts
unless the federal court will hear the claim against the nonfederal defen-
dant. The federal courts should remember that the basic policy behind the
doctrine of complete relief is fairness to claimants who are potentially
harmed by our dual court system. Therefore, in deserving circumstances,
the federal courts should allow jurisdiction over claims against pendent
defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lessons of history are startling. First, there is no historical dis-
tinction between "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. There is but one
jurisdictional doctrine: a court with jurisdiction over a case may answer
every question in that case, including nonfederal claims. This doctrine was-
devised to reduce the problems of a system with dual jurisdiction. Conflicts
between courts were reduced. More important, the rule was fair to litigants,
who after all are the reason the courts exist.
513. 437 U.S. at 374.
514. See id. at 383 (White, J., dissenting); Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
280 (1868); Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 334 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (Iredell,
Cir. J.); 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982).
515. See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
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The rules set out in the Supreme Court's most recent opinions ignore
this history. Rather than granting parties complete relief, they require the
federal courts to shut the door on parties, usually plaintiffs, granting them
only partial relief. True, the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion. But the inquiry should not be the posture of the parties or the
implications of the statutory grant of jurisdiction. Rather the court should
ask whether the nonfederal claim will enable it to give complete relief to
the parties properly before the court on a federal claim. To follow the
Court's recent departure from this principle "undercuts the very purposes
for which courts were created-that is, to try cases on their merits and
render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the par-
ties. "516
516. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 648 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
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